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IN DEFENSE OF THE SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE
DICHOTOMY
JENNIFER S. HENDRICKS*
ABSTRACT
John Hart Ely famously observed, "We were all brought up on
sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line between substance and
procedure, " but for most of Erie's history, the Supreme Court has
answered the question "Does this state law govern in federal court?" with
a "yes" or a "no." Beginning, however, with Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, and continuing with Semtek v. Lockheed Martin and the
dissenting opinion in Shady Grove v. Allstate, a shifting coalition of
justices has pursueda thirdpath. Instead of declaringstate law applicable
or inapplicable, they have claimed for themselves the prerogative to
fashion law that purportedly accommodates the interests of both
sovereigns. With the cover of an intellectual critique of the substanceprocedure dichotomy, the Court has thus embarked on a new phase of Erie
doctrine, a phase that replaces "yes" or "no" with "Let's see what we
can work out. "
This Article adds a new level of critique to the chorus of criticism that
has already been directed at these opinions. It argues that the new
enterprise and its blurring of the substance procedure dichotomy are
based on a misguided aspiration to accommodate state substantive
policies at the expense offederalprocedure.
Descriptively, in order to have a dichotomy, it is necessary to have two
poles. This Article therefore demonstrates that the distinction between
substance and procedure is appropriately represented by a singledimensional spectrum. Partof what the Court has done wrong is to ignore
this linear relationship by insisting, for example, in Semtek, that res
judicata is "too substantive" to be addressed in the Federal Rules yet
proceduralenough to be governed by federal common law under the Rules

* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. For generously taking the time
to give helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this Article, thanks are due to Steve Burbank, Sergio
Campos, Kevin Clermont, Robert Condlin, Judy Cornett, Thomas Main, Martin Redish, Tom Rowe,
Jay Tidmarsh, and Patrick Woolley. Thanks also to Jamelle Sharpe and the University of Illinois
College of Law for hosting the Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop at which Scott Dodson,
Charlton Copeland, Tara Grove, Sam Jordan, Abbe Gluck, Matthew Hall, Lumen Mulligan, and others
provided helpful comments; and to the participants in the junior faculty workshop hosted at the
Washington University School of Law by Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff.
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of Decision Act. In addition, given the linearity of substance and
procedure, one could imagine the distinction either as a dichotomy of
black and white, with every legal rule falling into one category or the
other, or as a spectrum of gray, with many or even most legal rulesfalling
in the mushy middle. Descriptively, of course, the latter view is more
accurate. This Article argues, however, that the Court should nevertheless
classify each legal rule as black or white, rather than try to accommodate
both its proceduraland its substantive aspects.
This Article offers two reasons for preferring the black-white
approach.First, the governing statutes contemplate a dichotomy between
substance and procedure, and the Court is not authorized to use the
ambiguity in that distinction to replace the statutory scheme with its own
discretionarytreatment of state law. Second, returning to the black-white
approach would promote democratic transparency in the states.
Specifically, in addition to traditional Erie concerns about judicial
lawmaking, Congress has set a policy of establishing a uniform body of
transsubstantiveprocedural law. State legislators know this, and there is
nothing wrong with federal courts expecting them to act accordingly. If
they, as Representative Dingell famously offered, prefer to manipulate
procedure in order to undermine the substantive rights they purport to
have created, the threat offixed procedures in diversity could and should
restrain them. Too often, the Supreme Court treats legislative enactments
as fixed, so that the game begins when the litigants start their forum
shopping. The game begins earlier, in the legislature, and the nascent
effort to accommodate state law through Erie doctrine creates the wrong
incentives for that game.
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In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has been taking legal
realism a bit too seriously. "We were all brought up on sophisticated talk
about the fluidity of the line between substance and procedure,"' but for
many years, when presented with a thorny problem of vertical choice of
law, the Supreme Court hemmed and hawed about the subtleness of the
distinction-and picked one. Ultimately, a decision had to be made; either
the federal courts would follow a particular state law in diversity cases or
they would not.
In the First Phase of Erie doctrine,2 state law was ascendant and usually
deemed binding. In the Second Phase, after Hanna v. Plumer,4 the Federal
Rules reigned supreme, sweeping aside state laws in or near their path.
While the Supreme Court's decisions in both phases sometimes strained
credulity, they did answer the question "Does this state law govern in
federal court?" with a "yes" or a "no." Beginning with Gasperiniv. Center
for Humanities,6 however, a shifting coalition of justices has pursued a
third path, declaring state law neither wholly applicable nor wholly
inapplicable. Instead, these justices have claimed for themselves the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
446 U.S.
note 69.
6.

John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth ofErie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See infra Part L.A.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
See infra Part lB. An exception during this Second Phase was Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,
740 (1980), which adhered to a prior Phase-One decision deferring to state law. See infra
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
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prerogative to fashion law that purportedly accommodates the interests of
both sovereigns. With the cover of an intellectual critique of the
substance-procedure dichotomy, this new approach represents a nascent
Third Phase of Erie doctrine, which would replace "yes" or "no" with
"Let's see what we can work out."
This new venture-so far, Gasperini,Semtek,8 and, most recently, four
or five justices in Shady Grove9-has been the object of "a chorus of
academic criticism." 0 Most of this criticism focuses on problems of
administrability, lack of adequate guidance to lower courts, and the
continuing absurdity of reading a Federal Rule to mean one thing in
federal cases and another in diversity.''
This Article adds a new level of critique. It argues that the Phase-Three
approach and its blurring of the substance-procedure dichotomy are
inappropriate uses of federal judicial power and are based on a misguided
aspiration to accommodate state substantive policies at the expense of
federal procedure. This thesis includes both a descriptive and a
prescriptive claim.
Descriptively, in order to have a dichotomy, it is necessary to have two
poles. This Article therefore demonstrates that the distinction between
substance and procedure is appropriately represented by a singledimensional spectrum. That is, even though there are several different
ways of making the distinction-the Rules of Decision Act ("RDA")
approach, 2 the Rules Enabling Act ("REA") approach,13 the inherent

7. See infra Part L.C.
8. Semtek nt'1 Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
9. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). The four
dissenters in Shady Grove used a Phase-Three approach, id. at 1460-73, while the lead opinion, joined
in full by four justices, used an aggressive version of the Phase-Two approach, id. at 1436-48. Justice
Stevens joined parts of the lead opinion and wrote a separate concurrence that appeared to agree with
the dissenters' approach in at least some respects, despite reaching a different conclusion, id. at 144860. See also infra Part 1.C.3.
10. Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the FederalRules: An Essay On What's
Wrong With the Recent Erie Decisions,92 VA. L. REV. 707, 708 (2006).
I1. See infra Part II.A. The Supreme Court has explicitly adopted separate interpretations of Rule
3 for diversity cases and federal question cases. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (disregarding the potential applicability of Rule 3 in a diversity case);
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (adhering to Ragan); West v. Conrail, 481
U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (holding that Rule 3 determines commencement of an action for purposes of the
statute of limitations in a federal question case). In Semtek and Shady Grove, the Court and the
dissenters, respectively, adopted novel interpretations of Rules 41(b) and 23, respectively, for diversity
cases which have yet to affect how those Rules are applied in federal question cases. See infra notes
131-32 and accompanyingtext.
12. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
13. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §2072 (2006).
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powers approach 4-the tests for these approaches can be understood as
marking different points along the same linear continuum. With pure
substance at one end and pure procedure at the other, all legal rules can be
thought of as lying at some point between these two poles. Part of what the
Court has done wrong is to ignore this linear relationship by insisting, for
example, in Sentek, that res judicata is "too substantive" to be addressed
in the Federal Rules yet procedural enough to be governed by federal
common law under the RDA."
Normatively, this Article defends the dichotomy between substance
and procedure. Given the linearity of substance and procedure, one could
imagine the distinction either as a dichotomy of black and white, with
every legal rule falling into one category or the other, or as a spectrum of
gray, with many or even most legal rules falling in the mushy middle.
Descriptively, of course, the latter view is more accurate. This Article
claims, however, that the Court should, with full awareness of the
grayness of all things, nevertheless classify each legal rule as black or
white, rather than try to accommodate both its procedural and its
substantive aspects. The classification need not be the same for all
purposes and in all contexts. The Court has good reasons for drawing the
line between substance and procedure differently under the RDA, under
the REA, and in other contexts. Within each context, however, a
particular legal rule should be classified as either black or white: either
substantive or procedural, governed by either federal or state law.
This Article offers two reasons for preferring the black-white
approach. First, the governing statutes contemplate a dichotomy between
substance and procedure, and the Court is not authorized to use the
ambiguity in that distinction to replace the statutory scheme with its own
discretionary treatment of state law. In the face of an already delicate
choice between state and federal law, trying to create nuanced
accommodations between the two allows the perfect to become the enemy
of the good. The Phase-Three approach may be feasible in the Supreme
Court or in scholarly articles, but it does not produce good doctrine on the
ground.

14. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008) (describing
and developing a theory for explaining the federal courts' inherent powers over procedure).
15. See infra Part II.B.1.
16. But see Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 903-04
(2011) (suggesting that the distinction between substance and procedure should not vary across
contexts).
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Second, eschewing Phase Three and returning to the black-white
approach would promote democratic transparency in the states.
Specifically, in addition to traditional Erie concerns about judicial
lawmaking, Congress has set a policy of establishing a uniform body of
transsubstantive procedural law." State lawmakers know this, and there is
nothing wrong with federal courts expecting them to act accordingly. If
they, as Representative Dingell famously offered, 18 prefer to manipulate
procedure in order to undermine the substantive rights they purport to have
created, the threat of fixed procedures in diversity could and should
restrain them. Too often, the Supreme Court treats legislative enactments
as fixed, so that the game begins when the litigants start their forum
shopping. The game begins earlier, in the legislature, and the ad hoc,
accommodating approach to state law in Erie's Third Phase creates the
wrong incentives for that game.
Part I of this Article describes Erie's three phases and identifies a key
characteristic of each phase's treatment of the relationship between state
law and the Federal Rules. For those readers fortunate enough to have
escaped law school before the Phase-Three approach emerged, Part I.C
describes Gasperini,Semtek, and Shady Grove in detail. Part I shows that
while the First Phase was characterized by deference to state policy and
the Second Phase by the ascendency of the Federal Rules, the nascent
Third Phase is characterized by judicial discretion in formulating the law
that controls in diversity cases. Part II.A argues that courts lack authority
for exercising this discretion: the Phase-Three approach presents itself as
creative problem solving that crafts accommodations to serve state and
federal interests; the proper role of the courts in this context is more
limited. Part II.B argues that the Phase-Three approach also undermines
separation of powers principles at the state level. The justices using this
approach have justified it by the purported need to vindicate state policy
choices. However, state-level democracy would be better served by
forcing state lawmakers to enact their policy choices into substantive law,
rather than allowing them to manipulate outcomes through procedure. 19

17. See infra text accompanying notes 237-40. Of course, Congress itself retains the prerogative
to adopt special procedures in particular substantive contexts. This prerogative troubles some scholars,
see infra Part II.C.2, but its resolution is beyond the scope of this Article.
18. "I'll let you write the substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you every
time." Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Regulations of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of
Rep. John Dingell).
19. As noted throughout the discussion supra, "substance" and "procedure" are fluid categories
and are inextricably intertwined. They are, nonetheless, "the terms the Enabling Act uses," Ely, supra
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One way to encourage them to do so is to adhere to a uniform system of
federal procedure, rather than modifying procedure on an ad hoc basis as
the Court did in Gasperini and Sentek. Thus, the justification for the
Phase-Three approach in Gasperini and Semtek-the need to protect state
lawmaking prerogatives-is misguided. Part III offers suggestions for
minimizing the damage of Gasperini and Semtek: confining them to their
facts and returning to the conceptual structure of Phase Two.
I. THE THREE PHASES OF ERIE

Vertical choice-of-law doctrine has developed in three stages since
Erie was decided. In Phase One, the Supreme Court held that most state
laws it encountered were "substantive" for purposes of the RDA.20 The
Court adopted a posture of deference, holding state law to be applicable in
federal court even to the point of neglecting or downplaying the force of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The result was a broad
understanding of what made a legal rule "substantive," focused on whether
a discrepancy in that legal rule would affect a litigant's ex ante choice of
forum.
In Phase Two, the Court reversed course, holding that most things were
not only procedural but also already covered by federal law. 2' It construed
the Federal Rules more broadly to displace state law and adhered to a
generous test for the permissible scope of the Rules. While the Federal
Rules had fared poorly in Phase One, state law fared poorly in Phase Two.
In both of these phases, however, the Court honored the need to choose:
state law either did or did not apply.
The Phase-Three approach strikes out in a new direction.22 It began, in
Gasperini, with the long-acknowledged observation that substance and
procedure are inextricably intertwined.23 A law that on its face regulates
procedure may be intended to serve a substantive policy. In Phases One
and Two, this reality meant that the decision whether to apply state law
was often difficult. In Phase Three, the justices using the new approach

note 1, at 724, and the existence of dawn and dusk does not negate the difference between night and
day. The question is what to do when the cases of dawn and dusk arise. This Article proposes that we
judge the Federal Rules according to the terms of the REA and call that realm of federal law
"procedural" and thus applicable in diversity cases. Everything else is, in this context, "substantive,"
which leaves plenty of room for state lawmakers to carry out their policies. This Article is agnostic on
whether the current approach to assessing the validity of the Rules under the REA is adequate.
20.

See infra Part I.A.

21. See infra Part lB.
22. See infra Part L.C.
23. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996).
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have taken the initiative to craft compromises that accommodate state
policy while retaining federal control. The nascent Third Phase is thus
characterized by the federal courts exercising discretionary authority over
whether and how to accommodate what they perceive to be substantive
policy preferences expressed in state procedural law. Proffered in the
name of protecting the states' substantive policies, the Phase-Three
approach paradoxically results in power over substantive law flowing to
the federal courts.
A. Phase One: Deference to the States
The Supreme Court held in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins24 that the Rules
of Decision Act requires a federal court sitting in diversity 25 to apply the
substantive law of the state in which it sits. 26 In the standard telling of the
story, the reasons for this decision were both jurisprudential and political.
Jurisprudentially, legal realism and positivism had swept aside belief in a
single, universal common law that could be discovered by state and
federal courts alike.2 Politically, the old guard in the federal courts was
adhering to common law doctrines-especially doctrines that hindered tort
plaintiffs-that in state courts were giving way to the demands of new
social realities in the wake of the industrial revolution. 2 8 The Erie doctrine

24. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. State substantive law may apply in federal court in contexts other than diversity jurisdiction,
such as when a state law claim is litigated under the supplemental jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 (2006). For the sake of convenience, this Article follows the common practice of referring to
Erie questions as arising primarily in diversity cases.
26. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. More precisely, federal courts must follow state law "rules of decision,"
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006), a requirement that in retrospect has been understood as drawing a distinction
that maps, at least approximately, onto the concepts of "substance" and "procedure." Before Erie,
federal courts sitting in diversity routinely applied state statutes and state common-law rules that were
understood to be "local," but under the doctrine of Siwift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), federal courts
followed their own lights on questions of general common law.
27.

See HOWARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 190

(2d ed. 1987); Edward A. Purcell, The Story of Erie: How, Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and
Social Change Reshape Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES at 23-24 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004)
(describing the pre-Erie"declaratory" theory of law).
28. See Purcell, supra note 27, at 25 ("[Before Erie], the federal courts were becoming identified
with the new national economy and the protection of corporate rights, and their 'general' law decisions
spread from commercial issues into most common-law fields and seemed to grow ever more favorable
to corporate interests."); JoEllen Lind, "ProceduralSwift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort
Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 732 (2004) ("According to some commentators,
Sivift [v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842),] secured the federal courts as 'business courts' used by corporations
to resist the claims of workers seeking redress for injuries."); Adam N. Steinman, hat Is the Erie
Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics ofJudicialFederalism?),84 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 245, 248 (2008) [hereinafter Steinman, hat Is the Erie Doctrine?]("Justice Brandeis'
ruling in Erie restrained a pro-corporate federal judiciary by eliminating its power to create substantive
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restricted the power of the federal diversity courts over substantive law,
confining them to the task of providing an alternative forum for enforcing
legal rights that are created and defined by the states.
Justice Reed, concurring in Erie, was the first to anticipate what would
become the central meaning of Erie to future generations: the distinction
between substance and procedure. He observed, "The line between
procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power
over procedure." Consistent with this point, Erie's First Phase was
devoted primarily to developing a menu of tests for distinguishing
substance from procedure under the RDA.o When a litigant proposes that
a particular state law should govern in a diversity action, and no federal
law or Rule supersedes the state law, federal courts ask whether the matter
is outcome determinative in the run of cases, a test which was later
refined to focus on the "twin aims" of Erie: avoiding inequitable outcomes
and discouraging forum shopping.32 If the matter is outcome determinative
in this sense, then state law should apply.33 Depending on the
circumstances, courts may also balance state interests and Erie concerns

rules of federal common law, which had operated to displace state rules that were often less favorable
to corporate litigants."). Given this historical context, it was ironic and perhaps politically convenient
for the Court that in Erie itself state law favored the corporate defendant. A similar reversal of typical
interests occurred in Shady Grove and may partly explain the alignment of liberal and conservative
justices in that case. See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1131, 1179 [hereinafter Steinman, Our
Class Action Federalism] (2011) (arguing that the justices in Shady Grove may have been looking
ahead to more typical cases, where defendants prefer the application of federal class action law and
plaintiffs prefer state law).
29. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (citation
omitted).
30. The Court at times refused to describe the distinction as one between substance and
procedure, perhaps wishing to retain those terms for marking the bounds of the REA. See Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) ("It is . . . immaterial whether statutes of limitations are
characterized either as 'substantive' or 'procedural' in State court opinions in any use of those terms
unrelated to the specific issue before us."). This Article refers to both the REA and the RDA and, for
that matter, the powers of Congress and the courts to regulate judicial proceedings-as distinguishing
between "substance" and "procedure," while recognizing that the dividing line is in a different place
under each regime. I will usually refer to matters as being either substantive or procedural for purposes
of the REA [or the RDA, or inherent powers, or whatever]. For readers who prefer a more prominent
reminder that these labels are conclusory rather than inherent in the matters discussed, I suggest
globally replacing "substance" and "procedure" with more clearly arbitrary terms, such as "salt" and
"pepper," or perhaps "matters governed by state law" and "matters governed by federal law."
31. Scholars have offered several formulations for determining when a rule of law is outcomedeterminative in a meaningful sense, rather than in the trivial sense that a litigant who refuses to follow
technical rules about, say, paper size will surely lose. See, e.g, Tidmarsh, supra note 16, at 908
(proposing an ex ante valuation approach).
32. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1965).
33. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
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against other federal interests that may favor the application of federal
law. 34
Although Justice Reed's comment in Erie could be read as implicitly
insisting that the brand-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not be
disregarded in diversity cases, the pattern that emerged was one of
avoiding or neglecting the Rules in cases that came to the Court as "Erie
cases." For the next three decades, the Court often bent over backwards to
apply state law, holding that state law governed even such plausibly
procedural matters as statutes of limitations, enforcement of arbitration
clauses, and bond requirements.35 For example, the Court showed great
deference to the states in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
36
Company. The question in Ragan was whether the plaintiff had satisfied
the statute of limitations by filing the complaint in federal court.
According to Federal Rule 3, an action is "commenced" as soon as it is
filed, which would seem to indicate that any limitations period stops
running.
State law, however, provided that an action was not
"commenced" until the summons had been served. 39 The Supreme Court

34. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958). Byrd was the only malor
Phase-One case in the RDA line that refused to follow state law, concluding that federal practice,
rather than state, determined the division of responsibility between judge and jury in federal court. Id
at 538 39. Byrd involved the potential applicability of the Seventh Amendment rather than a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure. Id. at 539. Although the Court did not reach the question whether the Seventh
Amendment required the outcome, the Court made plain that it reasoned in the shadow of the Seventh
Amendment by introducing the concept of "countervailing federal interests" into the Erie analysis. Id.
at 537 ("[T]here are affirmative countervailing interests at work here."). Confronted with a potential
constitutional command, the Court at last remembered that federal law is supreme; in this sense, Byrd
can be seen as a forerunner of the Second Phase.
Scholars disagree about the continuing viability of Byrd. Some point out that the Supreme Court
has rarely cited it and has not expressly followed its framework. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not
Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfriay Decent
Job in Its Erie-HannaJurisprudence?,73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 987 (1998) (criticizing scholars
who treat Byrd as the dominant framework). Others argue that despite the lack of explicit citation,
Byrd's conceptual structure has influenced the Court's analysis in many cases and that it remains the
best framework for approaching Erie questions. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of
Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 987 (2011); Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The
IrrepressibleInfluence ofByrd, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61 (2011).
35. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Amer., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (arbitration); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (bond requirement); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (action needed to toll statute of limitations by initiating
litigation); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (length of statute of limitation).
36. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 530. Relying heavily on stare decisis, the Court reaffirmed the outcome
of Ragan in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749, 750-51 (1980) (stating that Rule 3's
definition of "commencement" was relevant to internal court processes rather than to the statute of
limitations).
37. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531.
38.

FED. R. Civ. P. 3.

39. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 & n.4 (describing state law).
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acknowledged that federal courts treated Rule 3 as authoritative on this
question.40 Indeed, even after Ragan, Rule 3 continued to be understood as
defining commencement for statute of limitations purposes in federal
question cases. In diversity cases, however, Ragan held that local law
must govern. 42 This holding was characteristic of the First Phase, in which
the Court found that almost all law was "substantive" and thus controlled
by the states, even to the point of disregarding a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure.43
B. Phase Two: The Imperial Rules
By apt coincidence, Erie was decided in 1938, the same year the
Supreme Court first promulgated uniform, transsubstantive Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure for use in federal courts, pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act of 1934.44 Alongside the developing Erie doctrine distinguishing
substance from procedure under the RDA, a separate line of cases
addressed the validity of particular Federal Rules under the mandate of the
REA that the Rules govern "procedure" and do not "abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right." 45 The REA cases-most notably Sibbach v.
Wilson & Company4 6-adopted a broader understanding of the procedure
category: to this day, anything that "really regulates procedure" remains
valid territory for the Federal Rules. 47

40. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532-33 (citing Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1947)). This
interpretation of Rule 3 was confirmed in West v. Conrail,481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) ("[W]e now hold
that when the underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal
statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the action
is not barred if it has been 'commenced' in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed period.").
41. See West, 481 U.S. at 39.
42. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533.
43. See Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.R.D. 148, 150 (D. Del. 1969) ("Ragan seemed to
assert the supremacy of local law over Federal Rules in diversity cases whenever local law would have
barred the action had it been brought in a state court."). The dual-interpretation problem can be elided
by treating the "federal" version of each Federal Rule as a judicial gloss akin to common lawmaking.
If that gloss is "substantive" for RDA purposes, it must give way to a "state" version of the Federal
Rule in diversity cases. See Steinman,
at Is the Erie Doctrine?, supra note 28, at 282-87. However,
this is not how the Supreme Court has framed its analysis in the dual-interpretation cases. See
Clermont, supra note 34 (manuscript at 135) (stating that Shady Grove contradicted the predictions of
this theory); Posting of Adam Steinman, adam.steinman a shu.edu, to CIV-PROaLISTSERV.ND
.EDU (Apr. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
44. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §2072 (2006)).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
46. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
47. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 1; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (affirming that "really regulates procedure" remains the test under the
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During Phase One, the Supreme Court generally treated RDA/Erie
cases separately from REA cases. In Sibbach, for example, a possible
collision between the two statutes was avoided by the plaintiffs
concession that the matter was "procedural." 48 By such avoidance, the
Phase-One deference to state law in Erie cases was able to co-exist with
Sibbach's deferential posture toward the Rules.
Sibbach and the REA collided with Erie and the RDA in Hanna v.
Plumer,49 which marks the beginning of Erie's Second Phase. Hanna
recognized that if valid, controlling federal law dictated a result, that law
superseded any state law under both the Supremacy Clause and the
language of the RDA. 0 Unlike Ragan, Hanna implicitly recognized that
the Federal Rules are federal laws like any other. They thus control
whenever they validly apply.51
In Hanna, this issue played out in the context of service of process.
State law required personal service on the defendant, while Federal Rule 4
offered options for substituted service.52 Under cases like Ragan, the
defendant had a plausible argument that the mode of service constituted
substantive state policy to which the federal court should defer.53 Rule 4,
however, was valid under the "really regulates procedure" standard from

REA); Clermont, supra note 34 (manuscript at 132) (arguing that eight justices assented to this
conclusion in Shady Grove).
48. Sibbach,312 U.S. at10-11.
49. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
50. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-74. The RDA explicitly exempts instances in which "the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress" apply and prevent the application of
state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). Even without that caveat in the RDA, valid and applicable federal
law would preempt state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.
51. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473-74 ("To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease
to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either
the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in
the Enabling Act.").
52. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461-62 (describing the differences between state and federal
requirements). Commentators have pointed out that the perceived incompatibility between state and
federal law could have been avoided. State law, like federal law, allowed substituted service to initiate
the case but required personal service to toll the statute of limitations. Hanna thus appears inconsistent
with Ragan not only as a matter of theoretical approach but also in producing an irreconcilable
outcome. Cf supra note 43 and accompanying text.
53. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (holding that
state law determines when an action has "commenced" for purposes of tolling the statute of
limitations). Because state law determines whether service is required to toll the statute of limitations,
it makes sense that state law would determine how service must be performed.
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Sibbach.54 It was therefore a valid federal law that spoke directly to the
question, and it trumped state law.
After Hanna, the Court once again swung to the extreme, this time
aggressively reading federal law to displace state law.56 The zenith of this
Phase is illustrated by a pair of Alabama cases. In one, the plaintiff argued
that federal courts sitting in diversity should follow Alabama courts in
refusing to enforce forum-selection clauses.
Such clauses were
disfavored in Alabama.58 Although no federal law required that forumselection clauses be enforced, the Supreme Court held that the general
change-of-venue statute covered the territory and therefore superseded
Alabama law.59 The other Alabama case dealt with a state statute requiring
defendants to pay penalties for unsuccessful appeals.60 Again, no federal
law appeared directly on point. The Court, however, looked to federal
provisions that give judges discretion to tax costs on appeal. 6 1 In the
Phase-Two enthusiasm for federal law over state law, these federal
provisions were deemed sufficient to cover the territory of penalizing
unsuccessful appeals, and therefore to justify disregarding the state law.62
The Second Phase, then, was characterized by the Court's more aggressive
use of federal procedural law to avoid obligations to advance state
policies.
After Hanna, it was also clear that there were two separate standards
for distinguishing substance from procedure. In what Hanna called
"unguided Erie" analysis,63 courts distinguish between substance and
procedure by using the twin aims of Erie in combination with earlier
precedents such as Guaranty Trust v. York and Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, which ask whether the rule is outcome

54. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). Hanna
did not discuss, but later Courts and commentators have suggested, that a Rule could be generally
valid under Sibbach but invalid as applied. See infra text accompanying notes 114 28.
55. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464, 474.
56. The one exception is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), which is discussed
infra note 69.
57. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 24 (1988).
58. Steivart, 487 U.S. at 24.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006); Steiwart, 487 U.S. at 28.
60. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3 (1987). The penalty was 10 percent of the
judgment, plus costs on appeal.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1912; FED. R. APP. P. 38; Burlington,480 U.S. at 4.
62. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7. A court anxious to defer to state law could have perceived a
difference in purpose that would have allowed simultaneous application of the state and federal laws.
Taxation of court costs alleviates a small portion of the overall financial costs of litigation, while a 10
percent surcharge on the judgment is generally a more substantial amount and appears to be directed at
abuse of the appellate process as a delay tactic.
63. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).

116

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:103

determinative, whether it is bound up with substantive rights, and whether
there are countervailing federal interests. 64 On the spectrum from
substance to procedure, these tests mark a dividing line somewhere in the
midst of an admittedly large gray area. In contrast, when the analysis is
"guided" by the existence of a Federal Rule on point, the Court is much
more inclined to find that the matter is procedural. That is, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure get the benefit of the doubt that they really are
procedural. Thus, the dividing line created by the REA is at a different
point on the spectrum than the RDA line. A state law that would be
deemed "substantive" under unguided Erie analysis might still be
superseded by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
For example, in Ragan, the Court concluded that the state's rule for
how an action is "commenced" for statute of limitations purposes is
substantive under Erie.65 This conclusion followed naturally from
Guaranty Trust, which held that statutes of limitations were themselves
substantive. 66 The federal court in Ragan was therefore obliged to follow
state practice and hold that a diversity action had not been commenced
until the summons had been served. After Hanna, this case might have
come out the other way. 67 Rather than apply Erie's substance/procedure
test, the Court could have applied the REA test to Rule 3, which says that
an action is "commenced" when the complaint is filed. 8 If the Rule was
valid under the REA, it would control even in diversity cases and there
would be no need for an unguided Erie analysis.69

64. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 (describing the "twin aims" of Erie); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958) (Byrd balancing test); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
109 (1945) (outcome-determinative test).
65. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949).
66. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
67. The Supreme Court revisited Ragan after Hanna and adhered to its original holding, but it
did so largely as a matter of stare decisis. Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740, 749, 750-51 (1980),
discussed infra note 69.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
69. Again, the discussion in the text sets aside the possibility that the Rule is invalid as applied to
displace a particular state law. See infra text accompanying notes 114-28. Guaranty Trust, Ragan, and
Hanna all deal with rules that affect a statute of limitations. While it makes some sense for them all to
come out the same way, there has to be a dividing line somewhere in the gradual transition between
substance and procedure. Moreover, any discrepancy between Guaranty Trust and a decision
overruling Ragan would be ameliorated by considering the purpose that "commencement" of the
action serves. The state law in Ragan required service before the end of the limitations period,
presumably so the defendant would receive notice within that period. This approach is compatible with
the fact that state courts may allow a complaint to languish for months or years without being served
before it will be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Cynthia Ford, Does It Have to Be This Hard?
Rule 41(e) in Montana, 60 MONT. L. REV. 285, 347-51 (1999) (reviewing state rules regarding time
for service of process and reporting that, at one extreme, several states followed the Federal Rule
while, at the other extreme, California and Montana allowed three years). In federal court, however,
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In the first two phases of Erie, the Court swung between two poles,
first favoring state law, then federal law, especially the Federal Rules.
What emerged, however, was a reasonably clear framework of federal
supremacy tempered by the federalism of the RDA-or at least, it was
reasonably clear after John Hart Ely explained it.70 In addition, the first
two phases shared one overriding feature: in every case, the federal courts
were told either to follow their normal federal practices, even in diversity
cases, or to apply a particular rule of state law. In each case, the choice
between these two options and the content of the rule to be applied flowed
directly from federal laws, such as the REA, or from state laws, made
binding on diversity courts by virtue of the RDA.
C. Phase Three. A Third Way to Nowhere
After swinging once to each extreme-over-zealous deference to state
law, then aggressive implementation of the Federal Rules-one would
hope that the Supreme Court would retreat to a happy medium. Instead,
however, in Gasperiniand Semtek, the Court unveiled a new approach to
vertical choice of law in which, instead of choosing between state and
federal practice, the Court made up its own rule that conformed to
neither. Then, in Shady Grove, the Court splintered: Four dissenters
would have continued down the new path, while a four-justice plurality
rejected it.72 The ninth, Justice Stevens, appeared to lean toward the
dissenters' theoretical approach but disagreed with the application and so
voted with the plurality.7 3
Robert Condlin has observed that Gasperini is "the type of precedent
that, in retrospect, often turns out to be either the harbinger of a new
doctrinal order, or an analytical wild card never heard from again.
Only

service is generally required within 120 days of filing, which would ameliorate the concerns that
presumably motivated the state law in Ragan. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed Ragan after Hanna. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). Having
already lived with the dual interpretation of Rule 3 for three decades, the Court chose not to overrule
Ragan. Id. at 749 (noting the petitioner's inability to meet the burden of demonstrating why stare
decisis should not control).
70. See Ely, supra note 1. Note that this conceptual framework would be consistent with a more
rigorous approach to the REA's limitations on the Federal Rules.
71. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (discussed infra Part I.C.1);
Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (discussed infra Part I.C.2).
72. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (discussed
infra Part I.C.3).
73. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
74. Robert J. Condlin, A Formstone of Our Federalism The Erie/HannaDoctrine & Casebook
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time will tell "whether Gasperini becomes an integral part of a new
Erie/Hanna overview, or is forgotten as a doctrinal frolic and detour."
Two decisions later, the outcome is still unclear, especially because Justice
Stevens, now retired, was the swing vote in Shady Grove.76 This Article
aims to demonstrate that the Court should nip the Third Phase in its bud.
Phase Three is characterized by creative interpretation that constitutes
inappropriate freelancing by a Court that is supposed to be making a
choice of law.
1. Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities
William Gasperini was a photographer who lent several hundred of his
transparencies to the Center for the Humanities. The Center lost the
negatives, and Gasperini sued for compensation. Sitting in diversity, the
federal jury awarded $450,000, and the trial judge denied the Center's
motion to remit the verdict." On appeal, the Center argued that the Second
Circuit should review the reasonableness of the verdict pursuant to a New
York tort reform statute.79 The statute directed intermediate courts of
appeal to determine whether a jury verdict "deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation."80 The Center argued that this statute
reflected substantive policy in the State of New York.8' The RDA
therefore required the federal courts to follow New York law in place of
ordinary federal practice, in which appellate review of jury verdicts is
limited by historic practices under the common law. The Second Circuit
agreed and ordered that the verdict be reduced.
In the Supreme Court, Gasperini argued that the New York statute
conflicted with the Seventh Amendment. 84 The Supreme Court appeared

Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 475, 525 (2005).
75. Id.
76. Even the Shady Grove plurality, however, joined Semtek, a Phase-Three decision. Semtek,
531 U.S. at 497. Indeed, Justice Scalia authored both Semtek and the Shady Grove plurality opinion.
77. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996).
78. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 419 20.
79. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 420-21.
80. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 420 (quotingN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)).
81. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 426.
82. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427, 432-33.
83. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 426.
84. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. The Gasperini dissent also argued that the New York law was
displaced by Federal Rule 59. Id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Responding to this argument in a
footnote, the maiority indicated that it disagreed with Justice Scalia about the scope of the Rules. Id. at
437 n.22. For purposes of this Article, issues involving the applicability of a Federal Rule are
adequately presented by Semtek and Shady Grove, so I follow the Court in passing lightly over that
issue in Gasperini.
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to agree, ruling that federal appellate courts cannot apply the New York
standard. Under prior doctrine, that would have been the end of the
matter. Because there is valid federal law on point, it preempts the state
statute; federal courts obviously cannot rely on the RDA as grounds for
ignoring the Seventh Amendment. Indeed, in Byrd, the mere shadow of
the Seventh Amendment was enough to push the Court to declare the
division of labor between judge and jury to be a matter of procedure,
86
governed by federal law even in diversity cases.
In Gasperini, however, the Court did not stop there. Although it
adhered to its view that federal law controlled, it changed federal law by
inventing a new procedure to accommodate what it saw as New York's
substantive concerns. Although the Seventh Amendment barred the Court
of Appeals from reviewing the reasonableness of the jury verdict, the
Court held that the trial court could review the verdict, under the standard
set by the state statute." The result was "a pastiche of federal and state
law, but neither the one nor the other."88
2. Semtek v. Lockheed Martin
Semtek also involved the Court crafting a federal alternative rather than
simply choosing state law or ordinary federal practice. Semtek is a
confusing case, in part because of the knotty procedural problem at its
center: the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal for failure to meet the
statute of limitations.89 When a state court issues such a dismissal, state
law governs the preclusive consequences.90 In California, where Semtek
began, statute of limitations dismissals are not preclusive, so the plaintiff
remains free to re-file in a state with a more generous limitations period.9'

85. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 438.
86. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 & n.10 (1958) (stating that the
Court's decision was made "under the influence-if not the command of the Seventh Amendment"
and noting in a footnote that the Court was not deciding the Seventh Amendment question).
87. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436. The preceding paragraphs describe the New York law at issue as
it is described in the opening paragraph of Gasperini and as it has generally been treated in
commentary on that case. A more precise description of New York law, and a discussion of the
ramifications of that description, can be found infra Part III.C.
88. Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 707.
89. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 499 (2001) ("This case presents
the question whether the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment dismissing a diversity action on
statute-of-limitations grounds is determined by the law of the State in which the federal court sits.").
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) ("[J]udicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit
in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in courts of such State ...
from which they are taken."); Marrese v. Amer. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 375
(1985).
91. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500.
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The extra twist was that the dismissal in Semtek was by a federal court
sitting in diversity. In federal court, statute of limitations dismissals are
usually preclusive.92
The Supreme Court first asked whether the usual federal practice was
controlling. Lockheed Martin argued that the case was governed by
Rule 4 1(b), which at the time stated:
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.... Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for
failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication
upon the merits.9 3
Before Semtek, this Rule was widely understood to instruct that all
dismissals other than those listed can be claim preclusive as a matter of
federal law.94 In Semtek, however, the Court continued the unfortunate
practice, begun in Ragan, of reading a Federal Rule to mean something
different in diversity cases than in federal question cases. Rule 41(b), said
the Court, does not speak to claim preclusion at all. Rather, it merely bars
the plaintiff from re-filing the case in the same court.95 The Court's stated
reason for this implausible reading of Rule 41(b) was the fear that the Rule
as written was too substantive-that is, the Court suggested that the
natural reading of the Rule might run afoul of the REA because it would
modify or abridge the substantive right to bring the claim. 96
Having disposed of Rule 41(b), the Court was left with an unguided
Erie choice: should it deem this matter substantive and apply state law or
deem it procedural and apply some federal law? The twin aims of Erie
favored applying state law. Moreover, the Court had just suggested that
the preclusion question was "too substantive" to be covered by the Federal

92. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 500.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
94. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1027, 1045-46 (2002) (concluding based on the history of Rule 41's drafting
that the Rule was intended to govern only eligibility for preclusion); Michael J. Edney, Preclusive
Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 205
(2001) ("Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directly addresses the preclusive effect of
a dismissal before a full trial on the merits .... ); Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion
Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 577 (2003) ("[I]t is not surprising that [Rule 41] was the
only Federal Rule that was understood to expressly address preclusion prior to Semtek.").
95.

Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505-06.

96. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506 n.2. See also Clermont, supra note 34 (manuscript at 125) (calling
the Semtek interpretation of Rule 4 1(b) "strangely narrow").
97. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508; see also supra text accompanying note 32.
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Rules. Nonetheless, the Court insisted that federal law must control the
preclusive effects of diversity judgments. The stated reason for this
insistence was concern for the federal courts' ability to use dismissal of a
case as a sanction.9 8 What if, posited the Court, a state did not recognize
such a dismissal as preclusive? As discussed below, this concern was a red
herring. 99 For the Court, however, it was the justification for declaring that
the Court itself had inherent power over a matter it had just deemed too
substantive for a Federal Rule.
In a final twist, the Court reverted to Erie principles to decide what the
federal common law rule should be. 100 Rather than choose a uniform rule
of federal law, the Court held that federal common law would borrow the
rule of the forum state unless, on a case-by-case basis, there was an
important federal reason to choose a different rule. 101
3. Shady Grove v. Allstate
The most recent installment of the Third Phase is Shady Grove v.
Allstate.102 At issue in Shady Grove was an earlier New York tort reform
statute. This one prohibited class actions to recover statutory
"penalties."1 0 3 The New York statute conflicted with the ordinary
understanding of Rule 23, which sets the conditions under which class
actions are appropriate in federal court. 104

98. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 170-73.
100. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09 ("[A]ny other rule would produce the sort of 'forum-shopping
... and ... inequitable administration of the laws' that Erie seeks to avoid.") (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
101. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508-09. This rule is reminiscent of Byrd, in which a matter otherwise
governed by state law under the RDA can be governed by federal law if there is a countervailing
federal interest. See also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958), which is
discussed supra note 34. The difference is that Byrd acknowledged an obligation to follow state law in
the absence of such a federal interest, Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537, while the Semtek Court followed state law
as a matter of federal judicial discretion.
102. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
103. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (discussing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901). The prohibition on
penalty class actions was enacted as part of a general revision of New York class action law in
response to the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Stephen B. Burbank &
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 22
(2011). It reflected concerns that penalty class actions lead to overenforcement. Id. at 70.
104. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Since its adoption and despite
academic objections, Rule 23 has routinely been applied to class certifications without a prior
determination that the underlying substantive law authorizes class recovery. See David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 957 (1998) (arguing that
Rule 23 should be neutral as to whether the "entity model" of recovery through class actions is
substantively permitted); see also infra text accompanying notes 223 26 (summarizing Martin Redish
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Allstate, seeking to avoid a $5,000,000 class action in federal court
when the lead plaintiff would only be entitled to $500, argued that Rule 23
should be read more finely.105 Justice Ginsberg, writing for the four
dissenters, followed the path of Ragan, agreeing with Allstate that Rule 23
should be read to come into play only if the substantive law itself
authorized class actions. 10 Justice Ginsburg did not pretend that this
reading of Rule 23 was natural. Rather, she argued that courts should
consciously read the Rule to avoid conflict with the state's substantive
policy goals: they should "interpret the FederalRules in light of a State's
regulatory policy."10 7
The plurality, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected this argument
that an individual state's policy should influence the interpretation of
federal law. 108 Justice Scalia argued that Rule 23 should be given its
natural meaning as long as that meaning is valid under the REA.'0 9
Adhering to Sibbach's standard as a full statement of the REA's
limitations, he maintained that as long as a Rule "really regulates
procedure" in a general sense, it trumps any conflicting state law,
regardless of whether the state enacted the law for substantive policy
purposes rather than procedural ones. 0 Justice Stevens, the fifth vote for
rejecting the application of state law in Shady Grove itself, wrote
separately to hold out the possibility that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
could be invalid as applied in a rare case."' A Rule that, in general, "really
regulates procedure" might create such a disruption in state substantive
policy that it would be invalid for abridging, enlarging, or modifying a
substantive right.112 However, Justice Stevens concluded that Shady Grove
was not such a case, so he voted not to apply the state law." 3
The split in Shady Grove highlights an important debate over how to
determine the validity of Federal Rules. The current test is that a Rule is

and JoEllen Lind's arguments regarding the use of procedural rules to facilitate or impede class
actions).
105. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.
106. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1466-67 & n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
108. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440-41.
109. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442.
110. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444-45 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1941)).

111. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at1451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
112. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452-54 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
113. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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valid if it "really regulates procedure."" 4 This generous standard comes
from subpart (a) of the REA, which authorizes regulation of "practice and
procedure and rules of evidence."' 15 Academics have long bemoaned the
Supreme Court's neglect of subpart (b), which many interpret as an
independent limit on the Rules.'6 That is, even a Rule that "really
regulates procedure" might be invalid if it also "abridge[s], enlarge[s], or
modiflies] any substantive right."' 17 Shady Grove exposed a split between
those who would apply subpart (b) on a case-by-case, retail basis and
those who would determine the validity of Federal Rules strictly at the
wholesale level.118
Justice Scalia's plurality in Shady Grove took the wholesale approach.
The plurality opinion evaluated Rule 23 on its own terms and found it to
be targeted at the regulation of procedure. 119 While the plurality inquired
in a general sense whether the Rule regulated substantive matters, it did so
without reference to the particular state law at issue.120 As it happens, the
plurality's assessment of Rule 23 was especially deferential, even
simplistic. The opinion characterized class treatment as merely a matter of
joinder, disregarding powerful arguments to the contrary.121 One need not,
however, take such a deferential approach to the Rules in order to analyze
the validity of a Rule wholesale. One could adopt a more rigorous
approach to the REA's limitations and still apply them wholesale. The key
to the wholesale approach is that it hinges on the substantive or procedural
qualities of the Rule itself, without regard to the state law that the Rule

displaces.12 2
The Shady Grove dissent, and to a lesser extent Justice Stevens, took
the retail approach. They would determine the validity of the Federal Rule,
114. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445.
115. 28 U.S.C. §2072(a) (2006).
116. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 1, at 719 20; Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in
the Rules EnablingAct) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 48 (1998) (collecting citations);
see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1108 (1982)
(arguing that § 2072(b) does not have independent effect distinct from the effect of § 2072(a) but that
both reflect more substantial limitations on the courts than current doctrine acknowledges).
117. 28 U.S.C. §2072(b) (2006).
118. In addition to the Shady Grove opinions, compare Ely, supra note 1, at 733 34 (advocating
case-by-case determination of whether a state's interest in its laws is substantive or procedural) with
Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 727 ("The cautionary example of what has happened in the
related field of conflicts of laws, where case-by-case balancing of interests has threatened to
destabilize the entire field, should lead the Supreme Court to reinforce rather than retreat from a
uniform interpretation of general rules of procedure.").
119. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443-44.
120. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444.
121. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443.
122. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444.
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as applied, with reference to the state law.1 2 3 If the state law is understood
to serve substantive aims but uses a procedural mechanism to achieve
them, the Federal Rule may have to give way.124 For example, John Hart
Ely explained that whether a state prohibition on court-ordered medical
exams applied in federal court would depend on the reason for the state
ban. 125 If the ban were part of a general scheme of limited discovery, it
would be deemed procedural and thus trumped by the federal practice. 126
If, however, the state had enacted the ban as substantive protection for the
right to personal privacy, federal courts would have to honor it in diversity
cases. 127 In Shady Grove, the dissent argued that the state's restriction on
class actions served the substantive goal of limiting liability under penalty
clauses. Rule 23 was thus inapplicable in the particular circumstances of
the case, even if it is generally valid as a regulation of procedure. 128
The retail side of the wholesale/retail debate is the first step toward the
discretionary approach that characterizes Phase Three. In Shady Grove, the
dissent would have adopted an ad hoc interpretation of Rule 23 designed
to accommodate a particular state law. This form of accommodation is a
step toward Gasperini and Sentek, in which the Court created its own
procedures that combined elements of state and federal law. The degree of
judicial discretion is greater in the latter two cases, but the willingness to
strain federal law is the same and is still in keeping with Phase Three.
II.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE THIRD WAY

Gasperini and Semtek have been extensively analyzed and criticized,
and the same fate surely awaits Shady Grove. The divide between the
plurality and the dissent in Shady Grove presents a stark choice between
continuing the Phase-Three approach begun in Gasperini and Semtek or
returning to something like the conceptual structure of Phase Two.
Part II.A summarizes the extant criticism of the Phase-Three approach
to Erie questions. Part II.B argues that the judicial discretion that
characterizes Phase Three is unwarranted. Part II.C refutes the primary
theoretical justification for that discretion: While the Court has adopted a

123. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1451 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
124. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1451-52 & n.5 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. Ely, supra note 1, at 733 34 (using the facts ofSibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)).
126. Id. at 734.

127. Id.
128. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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pose of vindicating federalism by accommodating state policies, the
Phase-Three approach is neither required nor even necessarily helpful for
protecting the results of democratic processes in the states.
A. The Chorus of Criticism
The nascent Third Phase represented by Gasperini and Semtek (and
embraced by the Shady Grove dissent) has been criticized from several
quarters for being confusing and for failing to give adequate guidance to
the lower courts.129 Kevin Clermont offers mild praise for the Shady Grove
plurality for bringing greater clarity to Erie doctrine while backing off
from what I am calling the Phase-Three approach.130 The most common
complaint about Semtek and the Shady Grove dissent is their return to the
practice of creating dual readings for Federal Rules: Semtek and the Shady
Grove dissent both accepted strained, implausible interpretations of
Federal Rules to be used only in diversity cases, with the more natural
interpretation continuing to prevail in federal question cases.131 The
creative textualism of Semtek's Rule 41 and the Shady Grove dissent's
Rule 23 is perhaps to be admired as a matter of lawyerly semantic skill,
but it should not be embraced by courts. 32
Commentators have also noted that the ad hoc approach of the Third
Phase is in tension with Erie itself. Earl Dudley and George Rutherglen
observe that "federal district courts today arguably possess greater
freedom to reach desired results in diversity cases than they had under

129. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708 (describing a "chorus of academic
criticism" for Gasperini and Sentek); Rowe, supra note 34, at 963-66 (summarizing criticism of
Gasperini and defending the decision); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been
Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2008) (calling Gasperini "pitiful").
130. Clermont, supra note 34.
131. See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708-09 (summarizing the authors'
criticisms of Gasperini and Sentek), 717 (describing practical problems that are likely to arise from
reading Rule 59 (at issue in Gasperini)differently in diversity cases than in federal question cases),
722 23 (noting that Semtek's construction of the phrase "adjudication upon the merits" in Rule 41 was
original to Sentek and "so far as we have been able to determine, ha[d not] been adopted anywhere
else, let alone in the federal system"); J. Benjamin King, Clarificationand Disruption: The Effect of
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 161, 164 (1997)
(arguing that Gasperiniundermines reliance on apparently applicable Federal Rules).
132. One reason for rejecting such unnatural readings in order to reach a result in a particular case
is that potential for unforeseen consequences in other cases is substantial. For example, the Shady
Grove dissent would separate the "substantive" question of whether class remedies are available for a
particular cause of action from the "procedural" questions addressed by Rule 23. Shady Grove, 130 S.
Ct. at 1440. While perhaps a clever resolution of the case before it, such a holding would have opened
the door to litigation over whether class remedies are "available" as to every cause of action,
effectively creating a whole new field of law. See Posting of Edward A. Hartnett,
edward.hartnett a shu.edu, to CIV-PRO@aLISTSERV.ND.EDU (Mar. 31, 2010) (on file with author).
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Swift v. Tyson."'33 Douglas Floyd similarly complains that Gasperini's
open-ended interest balancing will lead to "unwarranted subordination of
substantive state objectives to 3ad
hoc judicial perceptions of amorphous
4
federal procedural 'interests."'"
Other commentators have praised both Gasperini and Semtek. Stephen
Burbank claims responsibility for much of Semtek, although he parts ways
with the Court over its strained reading of Rule 41(b), suggesting that the
Rule should simply have been held invalid.' 3 1 Praise for Gasperini has
come from those, like Thomas Rowe and Richard Freer, who applaud the
effort to accommodate state law and to give independent, retail-level
meaning to Part (b) of the REA.136 Professor Freer, however, is critical of
the Court's application of Erie's twin aims, 13 and Professor Rowe's praise
was in part contingent on the Court's continued production of solid
majority opinions, a record that was broken by the splintered decision in
Shady Grove.138
This Article joins with the critics of the discretion exercised by the
Supreme Court in Gasperini and the dissent in Shady Grove. It adds, in
Part II.B.1, that Semtek is of the same mold and, in Part II.C, that
democracy in the states may actually be better served by abandoning the
Phase Three approach.
B. The Supreme Court Should Not Freelance on Choice-of-Law Questions
This Part argues that the Supreme Court's freelancing on choice-of-law
questions involves an unwarranted exercise of federal judicial discretion.
In Semtek, the Court announced that federal common law would govern
the preclusive effect of federal diversity judgments, declining to apply
either Rule 41 or state law. Under the terms of Semtek itself, the Court's
authority for creating common law was suspect, and the Court did not

133. Dudley & Rutherglen, supranote 10, at 744-45. Interestingly, the lower courts do not seem
as interested in exercising this freedom as does the Supreme Court. See infra Part III.A.
134. C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997
BYU L. REv. 267, 269-70.
135. Burbank, supra note 94, at 1039-47.
136. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637
(1998); Rowe, supra note 34. Professor Rowe supports allowing states to override Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure on substantive policy grounds, arguing that such overrides will be rare and could
always be trumped by Congress.
137. Freer, supra note 136, at 1654-57.
138. Rowe, supra note 34, at 1014-15. Shady Grove also dashed Professor Rowe's hope that the
Gasperini dissenters were driven primarily by Seventh Amendment concerns and would join the rest
of the Court's deferential interpretive approach in future cases. Id. at 1008.
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justify its claim of power.13 In Gasperini, the Court presented itself as
creatively seeking an accommodation of its own devising between state
and federal law, effectively creating a federal common law of New York
remedies.140 This, too, the Court failed to justify. In both cases, the Court
should have eschewed the freelancing that characterizes the Third Phase.
1. The Trouble With Semtek: The Court's Inherent Powers Cannot
Logically Exceed the Power of the Court and CongressActing
Together
Semtek's reasoning is like a M6bius strip. The question presented starts
out as a seemingly procedural one regarding the effect of Federal
Rule 4 1(b). 141 But no, says the Court, the question is substantive and
therefore not reachable by the Federal Rules.142 Turn the page again,
however, and it is once again procedural-at least, procedural enough to
be subject to the inherent powers of the federal courts.143 If preclusion is
"too substantive" to be regulated by the Supreme Court and Congress
acting together through the REA, then the courts should not be able to
regulate it pursuant to their inherent power to regulate procedure.
The usual rule is that the preclusive effect of ajudgment is governed by
the law of the court that rendered the judgment.144 This rule allows the
parties to make reasonable predictions of potential preclusive effects and
to behave accordingly; it also vindicates the procedural interests of the
forum, which uses future preclusive effects as tools for controlling the
parties' behavior.145 Because the source of the law that will govern future
preclusive effects should be ascertainable at the time the first judgment is

139. See infra Part I.B. 1.
140. See infra Part II.B.2.
141. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501 (2001).
142. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
143. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508. This is not to suggest that questions of preclusion must be deemed
inherently "substantive" or "procedural" for all purposes. The distinction may be made differently
under the RDA and the REA. However, as discussed infra this section, the inquiries under the two
statutes are similar enough that a matter deemed "substantive" for REA purposes (under the current,
generous standard, which is highly deferential to the Federal Rules) should also be deemed
"substantive" for RDA purposes (under the unguided Erie analysis, which favors the "substantive"
label and thus the application of state law). The difference between the REA and the RDA tests lies in
the realm that is considered procedural in the sense that it may be governed by a Federal Rule but, in
the absence of a Rule, would be governed by state law rather than federal practice.
144. See Howard M. Erichson, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 945, 1001-02
(1998). Courts sometimes apply the preclusion law of the law-supplying jurisdiction from the first
case. Id. Either way, preclusive effects are predictable, since they do not depend on the law of the
enforcing jurisdiction.
145. See Erichson, supra note 144, at 1002-03.
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rendered, we can imagine that every judgment contains an invisible
footnote specifying the preclusion law that applies. A California judgment,
for example, contains an invisible footnote summarizing California
preclusion law. When that judgment is presented as a defense to litigation
in a Maryland court, the Maryland court applies the decisions embodied in
the judgment and the California rules of preclusion to the allegations made
in the Maryland action. From these elements, it determines whether the
Maryland action is precluded. The question in Semtek was: When a federal
court in California sits in diversity, does the invisible footnote to its
judgment contain California preclusion law or federal preclusion law?
As described above, the defendant in Semtek first argued that federal
law controlled because Rule 41(b) made the federal judgment
preclusive. 146 In the first part of the opinion, however, the Court adopted
an implausible reading of Rule 41(b), stating that this reading was
necessary because preclusion was dangerously substantive even for REA
purposes. 147 The Court warned that reading Rule 41(b) to govern
preclusive effect "would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of
the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right."' 48 This argument suggests that on the
spectrum from substance to procedure, the preclusion question in Semtek
falls on the "substance" side of the dividing line created by the REA.
Semtek's justification for its narrow reading of Rule 41(b) was that that
preclusion is "too substantive" for the REA.149
As discussed in Part I, the dividing line created by the REA is different
from the dividing line created by unguided Erie analysis pursuant to the
RDA. The REA line favors the application of federal law and thus favors
the label "procedure." The RDA line does the opposite. The difference
between the two is that some matters may be "procedural" for REA
purposes but "substantive" for RDA purposes. Therefore, even the
possibility of being "too substantive" for the REA should mean that
preclusion is "substantive" for Erie purposes as well.150 That means that,
under the RDA, the federal courts should follow state law. The invisible

146. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501.
147. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
148. Sentek, 531 U.S. at 503 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2072(b) (2000)).
149. One could read Semtek as addressing not preclusion generally but preclusive effect in the
context of statute of limitations dismissals. This reading is discussed infra Part III.B as an option for
limiting Sentek's effect, but it is not the most natural reading of the opinion, which speaks as if to
questions of preclusion generally.
150. In other words, the set of legal rules that are "procedural" for RDA purposes is a wholly
contained subset of the set of legal rules that are "procedural" for REA purposes.
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footnote of a diversity judgment would contain state law, and the
preclusive effect of the judgment of a federal court sitting in diversity
would be governed by the preclusion law of the state that provided the
substantive law.
And indeed, the Court initially suggested that this outcome would be
required, for it stated that applying the Federal Rule "would in many cases
violate the federalism principle of Erie. . . .""' Citing Walker v. Arnco
Steel, Hanna v. Plumer, and Guaranty Trust v. York, 5 2 the Court argued
that giving force to the Federal Rule would result in substantial variation
in outcomes between state and federal court, leading to the inequities and
forum shopping that the "twin aims" test is meant to prevent.5 3 So far,
preclusion sounds substantive for Erie purposes, and substantive enough
for REA purposes that a Rule treading the ground of preclusion should be
drained of life. This analysis ought to mean that the federal courts are
required by the RDA to follow state law.
In the second half of Semtek, however, the Court reversed course,
deciding that the preclusive effect of diversity judgments would instead be
governed by federal common law. 154 As support, the Court cited cases
suggesting that federal law controlled the preclusive effect of federal
judgments, but it conflated federal question cases with diversity cases and
conflated the obligation to give full faith and credit to federal judgments
with the determination of what such faith requires.155 The Court also relied
on a pre-REA case that it had already said no longer controlled.156 The
justification for making federal common law takes up barely more than a
page in the United States Reports, and nowhere does it identify the source

of the Court's authority. 5 7

151. Sentek, 531 U.S. at 504.
152. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). For more on these cases, see supraPart I.
153. Sentek, 531 U.S. at 504.
154. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507-08.
155. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 (citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Gunter v. Aft. Coast
Line R. Co., 200 U.S. 273 (1906); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903)). All three of the
cited cases involved the preclusive effects of federal judgments in federal question cases. After citing
them, the Semtek opinion states that "[t]he reasoning of that line of cases suggests" that the same
conclusion should be reached with respect to diversity judgments. Sentek, 531 U.S. at 507. This
assertion is conclusory: None of those three cases involved the preclusive effects of diversity
judgments, and the opinions therefore fail to speak to the reasons why the rule in diversity cases might
differ from the rule in federal question cases.
156. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501, 507-08 (discussing Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130
(1874)).
157. Sentek, 531 U.S. at 507-09.
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Commentators have suggested that Semtek was based on the Supreme
Court's inherent authority to govern procedural matters in the federal
courts.158 Although the Court is generally obliged to follow congressional
commands even in the realm of procedure, it is usually thought to be free
to develop rules of practice and procedure in the absence of congressional
action or a governing Rule. 159 Its authority to do so comes either from
Article III's establishment of the judicial branch or from Congress's
creation of lower courts and conferral of jurisdiction to decide cases.16 0
The problem with relying on this inherent power to explain Sentek is that
before turning to the inherent power, the Semtek Court had strongly
suggested that the matter at issue was substantive under both the REA and
the RDA.161 Of course, the location of the substance-procedure line may
vary according to the legal context, and we have already said that it is
different for the REA than for the RDA. The line could certainly lie in yet
another location for purposes of inherent power. However, if preclusion is
substantive for REA and RDA purposes, but procedural for inherent power
purposes, then the realm of inherent power is larger than the realm that
can be governed by Rules promulgated under the REA. This scheme
seems unlikely. The Supreme Court has already interpreted the REA to
permit any rule that "really regulates procedure."l62 This generous
standard reflects the reality that Congress's blessing in the REA enhances
the Court's inherent power. Just as in the Steel Seizure Case,163 the powers
belonging to one branch of government are at their strongest when that
branch acts in concert with another branch. 164 The Court's inherent power

158. See Woolley, supranote 94, at 537 ("While the Court did not identify the source of authority
for a federal common law of preclusion, it would appear that statutes creating the federal courts and
bestowing jurisdiction upon them provide an adequate basis-albeit an implicit one-for the
development of common law rules in this area." (footnote omitted)).

159. See Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of FederalCourts, 64 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 41 (2008) (describing the predominant view that inherent powers exist only in
"cases of indispensable necessity" and arguing for a broader view); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent
Powers of Federal Courts and the StructuralConstitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 743 (2001) ("As the
early Justices recognized but the modern Court has forgotten, the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress alone to determine whether or not to bestow beneficial powers.").
160. Barrett, supranote 14, at 835-46 (discussing the implications of these two potential sources
of authority).
161. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-04.
162. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010)
(adhering to this standard).
163. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate.").
164. Cf Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 598-99 (2008) ("Federal
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to make procedural law should not exceed its power to do the same when
buttressed by congressional authority.165 As Elizabeth Lear has explained,
The Rules Enabling Act ... and the Rules of Decision Act are ...

relevant to the scope of the Court's inherent power, representing
efforts by Congress to minimize friction between the federal courts
and Congress, and the federal courts and the States, respectively.
Together they form the outer limits of judicial innovation on the
procedural front. . . . While Congress may enact substantive or

procedural statutes that displace the substantive law of the States,
the Rules of Decision Act prohibits the Court from doing so under
the guise of the inherent power.166
For these reasons, the realm of inherent power should be a subset of the
realm of the REA. If preclusion is substantive for RDA purposes, either
the Federal Rule validly applies and controls, or else state law controls.
Depending on whether the Semtek Court was correct in the first half of its
opinion (calling preclusion substantive for both REA and RDA purposes)
or the second half (treating preclusion as procedural), either the Court
wrongly displaced the states' substantive authority or it wrongly ignored,
through convoluted interpretation, its own prior promulgation of
Rule 41(b).
There are two defenses that one could make of the Court's analysis in
Semtek, but each ultimately fails. First, perhaps my conception of the
spectrum from substance to procedure is misleadingly linear. I have
suggested that matters of "procedure" under the RDA and inherent powers
must be wholly contained subsets of matters that are "procedural" under

common law could be analogized to Justice Jackson's discussion of presidential authority in
Youngstoiwn Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saiwyer. Jackson's opinion explains the basic interaction between
Congress and a branch with largely derivative constitutional authority. I suggest that those dynamics
work similarly whether one considers Congress and the President (Youngstown), or Congress and the
Judiciary (federal common law)." (footnote omitted)).
165. Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on
the Frontier of the Inherent Poiwer, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1147, 1184, 1195 (2006) ("[I]t would be very
odd indeed if the Court could evade this restriction simply by relying on its inherent power.... The
Rules of Decision Act represents the congressional vision of the appropriate balance between state law
and inherent power lawmaking by the federal courts.").
166. Lear, supranote 165, at 1180-81; see also Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of
Federal ProceduralCommon Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751,
760 (1998) ("The Rules Enabling Act may constrain courts, even where they are not directly
interpreting a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure but are instead creating a federal common law rule of
'practice and procedure.' As Professors Westen and Lehman argue, 'the statutory prohibition on rules

that abridge "substantive rights" must be deemed to apply to judge-made rules too; otherwise, judges
could do through common law adjudication what they cannot do through the carefully circumscribed
and safeguarded mechanisms used to create the federal rule of civil procedure."').
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the REA. 16 Perhaps, however, the relationships among the RDA, the
REA, and inherent power are multidimensional. There might then be a
way to justify the Court's use of inherent power along a different axis.
Second, perhaps preclusion truly is substantive: Semtek is justified not by
the Court's inherent power over procedure but by substantive power to
make federal common law.
The first defense would draw on the long-neglected Part (b) of § 2072,
which prohibits a Federal Rule from abridging, enlarging, or modifying a
substantive right. Commentators have long complained that the Court's
"really regulates procedure" test for validity under the REA implements
only § 2072(a), authorizing the Court to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure.169 Many believe that some further constraint is needed in order
to fulfill § 2072(b)'s command not to alter substantive rights. 170 Preclusion
is a classic example of a body of law that is "procedural" in a sense but
can also reasonably be understood to alter substantive rights.' ' It might
then validly lie within the Court's inherent power over procedure while
still being "too substantive" for the REA.
The problem with this first defense of Semtek is the RDA. Surely, if
preclusion law alters substantive rights, it is substantive not just under the
REA but also under Erie/Hanna/RDA. The RDA thus directs the federal
courts to apply state law. The Semtek decision does not demonstrate that
state law does not "apply," and thus control, under the terms of the RDA.
Analogy to Justice Jackson's Steel Seizure framework is again useful
here: 172 While the Court's power over procedure is at its maximum when it
acts in conjunction with Congress, as under the REA, the Court's power is
minimal when it acts contrary to congressional command. 173 The adoption
of federal common law contrary to Congress's policy of following state
law can be justified under the inherent power only to protect the core

167. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
169. See, e.g., Ely, supranote 1, at 719-20; Kelleher, supra note 116, at 48 (collecting citations).
170. An alternative view is that the two together should have more teeth than the "really regulates
procedure" test has exhibited. See Burbank, supra note 116, at 1108 (arguing that § 2072(b) does not
have independent effect distinct from the effect of § 2072(a) but that the Court's approach since
Sibbach is too lenient).
171. See Barrett, supra note 14, at 830-31 (treating preclusion as a matter of procedural common
law but noting that its "status as 'procedural' is ... open to doubt").
172. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text (discussing Steel Seizure).
173. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.").
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ability of the federal courts to perform their judicial function. 1l4 That is a
heavy burden, which the Semtek Court did not attempt to meet.
Similarly, any legal rule that would be deemed "procedural" for
Erie/RDA purposes is also sufficiently procedural to be within the scope
of the REA."' A matter cannot be "too substantive" for the REA yet
within the scope of inherent power. The first defense therefore fails.
The second defense acknowledges preclusion as substantive for most
or all purposes. This defense posits that the authority claimed in Semtek
was not the inherent power over procedure but rather common law-making
power such as the Court exercises over maritime law or suits to which the
United States is a party.17 6 In order to make federal common law, however,
the Court is supposed to identify the federal interest that is at stake.'
There are two federal interests that are potentially at stake in the preclusive
effect of a diversity judgment: First, there is an interest in ensuring that
federal judgments receive full faith and credit. It is not apparent, however,
that this interest extends any further than ensuring that the diversity
judgment receives the same respect that would be accorded to a state court
judgment. Second, there is a federal interest in the conduct of the initial
litigation, which will be affected by the anticipated preclusive effects of
the judgment.' 8 That, however, is a procedural interest, and to justify
federal common law on that basis without invoking the federal courts'
power to regulate their own proceedings would be too fine a cut.
The Semtek Court did describe one situation in which such a federal
procedural interest would exist and would require a federal rule to control
preclusive effect. 179 That one situation was the possibility that a state's

174. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the scope of inherent power relative to power under the
REA).
175. This discussion assumes that a Federal Rule is either valid or invalid under the REA,
ignoring the possibility that a Rule might be generally valid but invalid as applied to displace a
particular state practice that serves substantive goals. See infra Part II.C (discussing reasons why Rules
should not be invalidated as applied). The issue of as-applied invalidity was not at play in Sentek since
the case involved the general rules of what preclusion laws should apply, not a state's idiosyncratic use
of matters ordinarily deemed procedural to achieve a substantive policy goal.
176. See Barrett, supra note 14, at 831-32 ("In Sentek, the Supreme Court hinted that its power to
formulate federal rules of preclusion rests on the same ground as its power to formulate substantive
common law: the lack of congressional guidance in an area of clearly federal concern."). However,
Barrett also points out that the Court did not elaborate on this justification in Sentek and that its other
preclusion cases have been silent on the source of power. Id. at 832.
177. See id. at 835, 837 n.73 (identifying the grounds for judicial power to formulate substantive
common law).
178. Erichson, supra note 144, at 1002-03 (discussing the forum's interest in the preclusion rules
that would later be applied to a judgment).
179. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
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courts might not give preclusive effect to dismissal as a sanction.180 This
policy would conflict with a federal court's interest in making its sanction
stick. The Semtek Court seemed to fear that, having intimated that
preclusion was substantive under the REA and flat-out stated that it was
substantive under Erie, it would be forced to live with the whims of states
that impose only ineffective sanctions on misbehaving litigants. This
example is an unconvincing basis for replacing state preclusion law with
federal common law if preclusion is, indeed, properly understood as
substantive for REA and RDA purposes. State courts, like federal courts,
prefer their sanctions to be meaningful, so it seems unlikely that a state
would adopt such a self-defeating policy as the Semtek Court imagined.
Moreover, there is no need to contort either preclusion law or Erie
doctrine to deal with that slight possibility. A federal court certainly has
the power to deprive a misbehaving party of property as a sanction,
whether that property takes the form of cash or a cause of action."' That
hardly means that that we need a federal common law of property.
Moreover, Byrd already permits case-by-case balancing of state and
federal interests, so a matter that would otherwise be controlled by state
law can be federalized because of compelling federal concerns in a
particular situation.182 If the Supreme Court truly believes that preclusion
is an otherwise substantive matter, the dismissal-as-sanction example at
best warrants federal common law only as an exception, not as the general
rule.
The outcome reached in Semtek has intuitive appeal: preclusion has a
substantive feel, especially in the context of a statute of limitations
dismissal, yet an equally strong intuition says that federal courts must
retain control over the enforcement of their judgments. As discussed
below, these concerns could be addressed without the free-wheeling
approach to judicial authority on display in Semtek.18 3 The Supreme Court
should not shake off the yoke of the REA by hinting that a matter is
substantive while simultaneously claiming inherent procedural authority to
regulate the matter on its own.

180. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509.
181. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52-53 (1991) (holding that Erie did not prevent a
federal court from using its inherent power to sanction a litigant, even where the state court might not
have imposed a similar sanction).
182. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (allowing courts to
balance Erie concerns against countervailing federal interests); cf Woolley, supra note 94 (arguing
that even under Sentek, most preclusion questions will be governed by federal law because the federal
interest will predominate).
183. See infra Part II.C.
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2. The Trouble With Gasperini: The RDA Does Not Authorize a Body
of FederalCommon Law
Other than the Supreme Court's inherent power over procedure, there
is only one possible source of authority for making a federal common law
of preclusion for diversity cases. It is also the only available source of
authority for making a federal common law of New York tort damages in
Gasperini.That source is the RDA itself. The point of Erie, however, was
that neither the RDA nor any other provision of federal law authorizes
federal courts to create general common law. 184 To the extent that the
GasperiniCourt perceived itself as creatively accommodating state law to
the requirements of federal constitutional procedure, it reached beyond its
authority, as it did in Sentek.
Congress's grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts could, in
theory, be understood to include a grant of lawmaking power.' In the
course of hearing common law claims, the federal courts would make the
law to apply to those claims. However, the RDA, as interpreted in Erie,
rejects that approach.18 6 Rather than authorizing federal courts to make
substantive law, it directs them to take the applicable state law as they find
it.

In Gasperini, the Court behaved as if it were trapped between the
RDA's command that it follow the state's substantive policy and the
Seventh Amendment's command to respect the jury's verdict.' 8 In a
conflict between a state statute and the Constitution, it is clear which one
prevails. Nonetheless, the Court responded to the force of Erie policy by
seeking out a resolution that would enforce state policy without offending
the Seventh Amendment, perhaps distorting its Seventh Amendment
analysis to get there.188 The RDA, however, says that the federal courts
should follow state law where it applies, not that they should devise new
laws in order to serve the policy goals they believe to have been
articulated by the states. The Court's freelancing in Gasperini took it
exactly where Erie meant it should not go: rather than simply apply state

184. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
185. See Martha A. Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope ofFederal Common Laiw, 99 HARV. L. REV.
881, 915-16 (1986) (noting this possibility and its rejection in Erie); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray,
A Theory ofFederal Common Laiw, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 585, 623 (2006) (noting that Semtek involved
federal common lawmaking based solely on the existence of diversity jurisdiction).
186. See Field, supra note 185, at 915-16.
187. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
188.

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 629 (2000) (sharply criticizing

Gasperini'streatment of the Seventh Amendment, calling it "aberrant" and not worthy of deference as
a matter of stare decisis).
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law, the Court had to discern what policies New York legislators meant to
pursue, balance those state policies with federal interests, and devise a
practice that the Court believed would appropriately accommodate those
interests.189
As in Semtek, in Gasperinithe Court took upon itself the authority to
formulate the law that would apply to a diversity case. In Sentek, the
Court appears to have done so on the basis of its inherent powers. As
shown in Part II.A, however, inherent powers were unavailable in light of
the Semtek Court's rationale for rejecting the applicability of Rule 41(b).
In Gasperini, the Court did not explain why it could develop policy to
accommodate state interests rather than simply apply (or not apply) state
law. The RDA rejects such a role for the federal courts in diversity. In
both Sentek and Gasperini,the Court's approach was justified in the name
of accommodating state substantive policy but resulted in discretionary,
policy-making authority accruing in the federal courts. 90
C. The REA and the Scope of State LegislativeAuthority
In Semtek and Gasperini, the Supreme Court seemed to see itself as
serving the goals of Erie and the RDA by accommodating state law, yet
retaining federal supremacy where necessary. This Part argues that the
Court's good intentions toward the states were misplaced. The Court's
efforts to forge creative compromises between state and federal practices
magnify judicial discretion, which is contrary to both the federalism and
the separation of powers aspects of Erie and the REA. Moreover, the
Court's justification for increasing its own discretion-greater
accommodation of state law-is flawed. Paradoxically, federalism and
respect for state authority over substantive law could be equally well
served by a wholesale approach that adheres to valid Federal Rules
regardless of the states' idiosyncratic use of procedure to serve substantive
goals. This is so because a uniformly applied set of Federal Rules would
put state lawmakers on notice of the procedures to be used in diversity
cases and allow them to formulate their substantive law accordingly. This

189. As noted above, this description of Gasperini is based on the summary paragraph at the
beginning of the opinion, Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418-19, and the presentation of the case in most
commentaries. See supra note 79. A better approach, which the Court may have had in mind but which
it did not clearly express, is described infra PartIlI.C.
190. See generally Laura E. Little, Empowerment Through Restraint: Reverse Preemption or
Hybrid Lawmaking?, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 955, 958-59 (2009) (demonstrating that apparent
deference to state law can "empower a strong federal judiciary" and highlighting the opportunities
thereby created for hybrid lawmaking, especially the incorporation of principles of international law).
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approach would have the additional benefit of increasing democratic
transparency in the states.
1. Echoes of the First Two Phases
The Court's choice-of-law decisions in Phase Three echo some of the
themes from Phases One and Two, and are thus subject to the same
critiques. While Phase Two had its excesses, its conceptual framework
was sound; part of the problem with Phase Three is the re-introduction of
mistakes from Phase One. The Court should abandon these mistakes and
return to a moderated version of Phase Two.
Before Hanna, the Supreme Court inaugurated the practice of adopting
implausibly narrow readings of Federal Rules in order to apply state law
instead. 191 This practice has returned in Phase Three. 192 The practice is
especially pernicious when a more natural reading of the Rule continues to
be applied in federal question cases, so that the same language in the same
Rule means two different things depending on the basis for federal
jurisdiction. Even Justice Stevens's retail approach in Shady Grove would
be an improvement, if it entailed frank acknowledgement that the Rule
was being found invalid as applied rather than disingenuously distorted.193
This conceptual improvement, however, would not solve the problem
of excessive discretion by the federal courts. The retail approach means
having federal judges decide in every case whether a state's true motive
for its law is substantive or procedural, a more difficult task than the
already difficult one of classifying an actual rule or law as such. Each case
would also involve a Byrd-like weighing of those state interests against
any federal interests at stake.19 4 In contrast, the approach of the Shady
Grove plurality could mark the end of Phase Three and a return to the
conceptual structure of Phase Two, although ideally with a less aggressive
approach to defining the sweep of Federal Rules. As discussed below, this

191. See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); see also
supra Part I.A.
192. See supra Parts 1.C.2 and I.C.3 (discussing Sentek and Shady Grove).
193. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also supra text accompanying
notes 123-28.
194. This is not to say that Byrd should be abandoned in the unguided Erie context, or that Byrdlike concerns cannot be relevant even in the REA context. See Freer & Arthur, supra note 34, at 102
(arguing that the policies reflected in Byrd pervade both RDA and REA analysis). Rather, it is to
suggest that federal courts should not have to engage in Byrd-like balancing every time they apply a
Federal Rule in a diversity case where local practice would differ.
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return would best be served by taking the wholesale, rather than the retail,
approach to the Rules themselves.
2. SeparatingSubstance and Procedureto Improve State Lawmaking
While Phase Two may have gone too far, it was conceptually the right
approach, and the Shady Grove plurality is right about how the validity of
Rules should be evaluated. Many of the pros and cons of the wholesale
and retail approaches have been debated elsewhere.195 Here, I focus on one
argument for the wholesale approach that has been neglected and that
directly answers one of the main concerns of those on the retail side.
A primary theoretical argument on the retail side is respect for
democratic enactments in the states. This Part shows, however, that
adhering to federal procedures can be beneficial to state-level democracy,
because it forces state lawmakers to make their policy preferences clear
through the substantive law rather than masking preferences through
specialized procedure. This justification for wholesale, rather than retail,
federal procedure gains support from the observations of several theorists
who have, from a variety of perspectives, analyzed the relationship
between substance and procedure in light of democratic norms.19 6
Moreover, at least in recent years, this justification is consistent with
congressional action manifesting a desire to maintain the federal courts as
a procedurally independent forum for litigating state law claims. 197
A wholesale approach to the Federal Rules has the potential to improve
state lawmaking by forcing state lawmakers to be more open and
transparent with respect to substantive goals. The fact that state law claims
will be adjudicated under federal procedures reduces the ability of state
lawmakers to say, with Representative Dingell, "I'll let you write the
substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you every

time."l98 Dingell's statement reflects the fact that a substantive goal can

195. See Ely, supranote 1, at 733-34 (outlining and endorsing the retail approach); see also Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440-48 (endorsing the wholesale approach and criticizing the retail approach
used by the dissent and concurrence).
196. See infra text accompanying notes 200-31.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 237-40.
198. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Regulations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of
Rep. John Dingell). In many states, state lawmakers may be less sophisticated than Congress in their
ability to manipulate substance through procedure. Many state legislatures are part-time and lack the
staff and other resources to carry through on a boast like Representative Dingell's. That reality,
however, strengthens the argument made in the text. State legislators who lack such resources are more
vulnerable to the influence of lobbying and may support seemingly innocuous procedural reforms
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easily be undermined by imposing procedural hurdles. Substantive
entitlements are visible to the public when it assesses the government's
work, while procedural mechanisms are more arcane, difficult to
understand, and usually transsubstantive. When lawmakers tinker with
procedure on a substance-specific basis, they often do so in order to
modify substantive rights de facto, even if the substantive right remains
formally unchanged.
Many will regard the lawmaker's ability to fine tune substantive rights
through procedural mechanisms as a good thing. Legislatures retain
ultimate control over many aspects of procedure in part because of the
close connection between substance and procedure. Indeed, the notion of a
dichotomy between the two categories is relatively recent.199 Nonetheless,
that dichotomy now lies at the root of the litigation framework that has
been created by Congress and that is contemplated by diversity
jurisdiction, the RDA as interpreted in Erie and its progeny, and the REA.
My argument here is that this dichotomy is not necessarily a usurpation of
state legislative prerogatives, but instead can enhance the democratic
legitimacy of state substantive law. While substance and procedure may be
inextricably intertwined, there is still value in trying to separate them.
Other commentators have argued that separating substance from
procedure can promote democratic values. 200 Their analyses have focused
on concerns that some of the Federal Rules are "too substantive" and thus
improperly alter substantive rights under state and federal law alike.20'
This Article takes no position on where the substance-procedure line
should be drawn for purposes of the REA, except that the line should be
drawn wholesale rather than retail. However, the democratic problems
created by an over-reaching judiciary that uses procedure improperly to
affect substance are similar in kind to those of a legislature that does the
same. The same theoretical points thus support the idea that adherence to
the Federal Rules in federal court is no insult to the democratic processes
or lawmaking authority of the states.

without realizing their substantive effects. The lawmakers themselves may be in the same position as
the general public when it comes to the opaqueness of procedure.
199. Thomas 0. Main, The ProceduralFoundationof Substantive Laiw, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801,
804-10 (2010) (describing how the concept of substance and procedure as a dichotomy emerged along
with the convergence of law and equity and coincided with the early development of courts in the
United States).
200. See infra text accompanying notes 202-16, 220-26 (discussing work by Martin Redish and
JoEllen Lind).
201. See, e.g, Lind, supra note 28; Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
71 [hereinafter Redish, Class Actions].
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Martin Redish's work contains the most explicit and extensive
discussion of the democratic implications of manipulating procedure in
order to affect substance in the context of purely federal law.202 Professor
Redish argues that a legislature has a duty to be forthright about the
substantive rights it enacts into law. As part of that duty, the legislature
cannot create opaque procedural requirements that effectively undermine
the rights proclaimed by the substantive law: "For example, in formally
adopting 'standard A' as a general rule of decision, while simultaneously
requiring the federal courts to reach decisions that effectively amount to
adoption of 'standard B' or 'standard "not A,' Congress has substantially
subverted the representational democratic process."203 Professor Redish
argues that this sort of legislative deception could violate both the
procedural due process rights of litigants and the separation of powers.204
An example where procedural rights might be violated is Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman have
demonstrated that the remedial scheme established under Title VII is so
burdensome on claimants, so unforgiving about its short deadlines, and so
poorly designed as a response to the real-life experience of discrimination
that Congress has failed to protect the substantive rights purportedly
created by Title VII.201 While Congress may or may not have been under a
duty to create those substantive rights, it claims to have created them and
reaps the political benefit of having done so. If it has encumbered those
substantive rights with such a defective enforcement mechanism that they
effectively do not exist for a substantial portion of people, then perhaps,
under Professor Redish's theory, Congress has violated the Due Process
Clause by purporting to create a substantive right but then making it
overly burdensome to vindicate that right.
Separation of powers is a more salient concern when Congress forces
the courts to employ Orwellian double-speak. Professor Redish, with
Christopher Pudelski, argues that the Supreme Court implicitly recognized

202. See Redish, Class Actions, supra note 201; Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial
Independence: Constitutionaland Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995) [hereinafter
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence]; Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative
Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of
United States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 437 (2006) [hereinafter Redish & Pudelski, Legislative
Deception].
203. Redish, FederalJudicial Independence, supra note 202, at 715.
204. Id. at 716.
205. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming
System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008). That Brake & Grossman's thesis is an example of Redish's point
is pointed out in Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a
Trichotomy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1547, 1557-58 (2008).
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this problem in United States v. Klein.206 Klein involved the ability of
Southerners to reclaim property lost during the Civil War.207 To prevail, a
claimant had to have remained loyal to the United States. 208 The Supreme
Court had held that receipt of a presidential pardon constituted proof of
loyalty.209 Congress had sought to reverse that presumption, declaring that
a pardon should instead be taken as proof of disloyalty.210 In Klein, the
Supreme Court struck down the presumption, but the precise reason for
doing so is not clear from the opinion. The statute drew into question not
only the independence of the judiciary in determining the evidentiary
significance of a particular fact but also the scope of the president's pardon
power.21 Redish and Pudelski make a convincing argument that concerns
about legislative deception were part of the mix.2 12 Professor Redish has
argued that the same concerns should have led to a different outcome in
Michael H v. Gerald G., in which the Supreme Court upheld California's
marital presumption of paternity, rejecting the parental claims of the
genetic father in favor of the mother's husband.213 Having promised the
public that "loyal" Southerners would reclaim their property and that
"fathers" would have legal rights as parents, the legislature could not
require the courts to make a mockery of language by following
presumptions that forced the opposite conclusions. Professor Redish
argues, "Under separation-of-powers principles, this congressional action
is defective, because it effectively enlists the federal judiciary in a scheme
to bring about voter confusion.
Professor Redish's argument is a difficult one where the deceptive
procedural requirement is created by the same legislature that has power
over the substantive law. Even opaque procedural statutes are public and
open to inspection. And lawyers, at least, are accustomed to the occasional
counterintuitive presumption or definition. If "substance" and "procedure"
are merely labels that attach to conclusions, why not "father" and "loyal"?
Moreover, in each of Professor Redish's examples, the legislative
presumption is reasonably defensible. Pardons are usually granted to

206. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), which is discussed in Redish &
Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supra note 202.
207. Klein, 80 U.S. at 132.
208. Klein, 80 U.S. at 131-32.
209. Klein, 80 U.S. at 142.
210. Klein, 80 U.S. at 143-44.
211. Klein, 80 U.S. at 148.
212.

Redish & Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supranote 202, at 447-51.

213. Redish, FederalJudicial Independence, supra note 202, at 716-17.
214. Id. at 716.
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people who have, in fact, done something wrong, and an admission of
guilt is sometimes required. Congress may have been justifiably outraged
that pardons were being used to deem people "loyal" for purposes of its
compensation scheme. Similarly, marriage to a child's mother has
historically been the crux of legal and social fatherhood.2 " The marital
presumption in Michael H could be mocked only because of fairly recent
technology allowing for the identification of a genetic father. It is difficult
to pinpoint when a legislative presumption would become so absurd that it
would violate the separation of powers to force the courts to speak in the
legislature's terms.
Professor Redish acknowledges that it would be difficult to say when a
procedural statute goes so far in deceiving the public about the substantive
content of the law that a court should strike it down.216 For purposes of my
claim, however, that line need not be drawn. I do not suggest that state
laws be struck down as unconstitutional for intermingling substance and
procedure. Rather, I argue that federal courts should recognize that
adhering to a uniform system of federal procedure can benefit democratic
process in the states, even when displacing state procedure affects
substantive outcomes. Protecting procedure from the legislature prevents
lawmakers from engaging in the sort of deception that Professor Redish
criticizes.
In a similar vein, Linda Mullenix has argued that maintaining
independent procedures is necessary for a well-functioning independent
217
judiciary. Her focus is on Congress's increasingly frequent interventions
in federal procedure over the past thirty years.218 Professor Mullenix
decries the resulting politicization of federal procedure as it is created
through legislative rather than judicial institutions.2 19 The same
phenomenon can occur at the state level. If it does, state courts, drawing
on either Redish's or Mullenix's ideas, might decide that their prerogatives
have been invaded and strike down excessive legislative interference with

215. Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining Fatherhood, 10
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 132, 132 (2003) ("Largely in the name of gender equality and to some extent
in the name of children's rights, we have moved from a legal definition of fatherhood linked to
marriage towards a legal definition of fatherhood linked to genes.").
216. Redish & Pudelski, Legislative Deception, supra note 202, at 457-58 (describing five
difficult questions about the model of legislative deception, including "[I]f it is conceded that all
procedural and evidentiary rules may in some sense impact the substantive rights being enforced, why
disapprove of such a connection only in certain contexts?").
217. Linda S. Mullenix, JudicialPower and the Rules EnablingAct, 46 MERCER L. REv. 733, 734
(1995) ("A judiciary that cannot create its own procedural rules is not an independent judiciary.").
218. Id. at 735-36.
219. Id. at 754-55.
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procedure as a matter of state separation of powers. Even without such
drastic action, however, the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction can
check the ability of state legislators to manipulate substance through
procedure.
Professor Redish's theory described above is concerned with legislators
using procedure to subvert substance. Professor Redish and others have
also expressed concern about judges doing the same thing.220 JoEllen Lind
terms this phenomenon "procedural Swift" and accuses the federal courts,
jointly with Congress, of manipulating procedure to undermine state
substantive law.221 Professor Redish has also argued that courts wrongly
use procedure to transform substantive law. 222 Interestingly, Lind and
Redish both point to class action procedure as a prime example, but from
opposite perspectives. Professor Lind argues that the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005223 and stringent federal standards for certification
permit defendants to remove to federal court and thereby avoid legitimate
224
enforcement of state law through class mechanisms2. Congress, she
argues, should not "use complex litigation to hide law reform that could
not gain public approval if its consequences were better known." 225
Professor Redish, in contrast, argues that the judicial invention and
liberalization of class actions to make feasible certain claims that would
not otherwise be brought is an illegitimate departure from legislative
expectations. 226
This difference between Lind and Redish on class actions is a matter of
baselines. As David Shapiro has pointed out, the availability or nonavailability of class actions affects enforcement of substantive law, but this
fact does not tell us what the default rule should be.227 More generally,
220. See, e.g., Lear, supra note 165, at 1152 ("This Article takes the position that the Court must
abandon the forum non conveniens doctrine as an unconstitutional usurpation of congressional
power."); Lind, supra note 28; Redish, FederalJudicialIndependence, supra note 202.
221. Lind, supra note 28, at 719 ("Procedural Swift ... is the strategy of creating federal tort law
through the guise of regulating procedure." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
222. See Redish, Class Actions, supra note 201, at 73-74.
223. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (making several
changes to class action procedure, including provisions making it much easier for defendants to
remove large class actions to federal court).
224. See Lind, supra note 28, at 754 (suggesting that the goal of various federal procedural
reforms "is to curtail mass tort class actions altogether by redirecting them to the federal forum where
they will be obstructed so profoundly that defendants' overall liability will be reduced.").
225. Id at 719.
226. Redish, Class Actions, supra note 201, at 73-77.
227. Shapiro, supra note 104, at 957 ("[E]ven one who takes a broader view than I do of the scope
of judicial rulemaking power should, I believe, balk at the use of that power either to endorse or to
reject the entity theory [of class actions] advanced here.").
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Thomas Main argues that substantive law is always premised on the
procedural system that legislators assume will be used to enforce it. 228 Any
change in procedures will affect the balance of deterrence contemplated
when the law was enacted.229 Professor Main concludes with two proposed
solutions to the problem of "mismatch" between procedures when a court
applies foreign law. First, when a court applies foreign law, it should apply
as much foreign law, both substantive and procedural, as possible;
legislatures, in turn, should intermingle substance with specially tailored
procedure to a greater extent than they do now. Second, at the policy level,
courts should strive to harmonize procedure across jurisdictions .230

In the domestic choice-of-law context in federal courts, both
administrative and theoretical considerations favor Professor Main's
second solution over his first. Administratively, federal courts should not
be required to adopt large chunks of the procedural devices of the fifty
states while simultaneously operating under the uniform Federal Rules.
Moreover, procedure changes over time, and fidelity to Professor Main's
goal of fulfilling legislative expectations would require courts to discover
and apply the procedures that existed at the time each substantive rule was
adopted. Theoretically, as discussed above, uniform procedure requires
legislatures to pursue their substantive goals more transparently.
In addition, Professor Main's claim that changes in procedure wrongly
interfere with legislative expectations rests heavily on a deterrence theory
of lawmaking.23' While many lawmakers may operate from that
perspective, the public may expect the substantive law to mean what it
says in every case, not just as a matter of probabilities and enforcement
rates. Only people who have been through at least one year of law school
are likely to be comfortable answering the question "Isn't that illegal?"
with "Yes, but nothing is meant to be done about it."
The approach advocated in this Article puts some burden on state
lawmakers to be familiar with federal judicial procedures and perhaps
even to amend substantive law occasionally to keep pace with evolving
procedural law. As long as we are satisfied that "procedural law," as
embodied in the Federal Rules and in the federal courts' use of inherent
authority, is sufficiently procedural, this is not too much to ask of

228. Main, supra note 199, at 802.
229. Id. at 823-25.
230. Id. at 838-40. Professor Main also advises courts to be humble and skeptical about their
ability to apply foreign law. Id. at 838.
231. See id. at 823-25 (describing legislation as calibrated to achieve a particular level of
deterrence).
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legislators. Congress unquestionably has the power to determine federal
procedure and to confer diversity jurisdiction.232 By following uniform,
transsubstantive procedure, the federal courts may deprive state lawmakers
of the ability to modify their own substantive creations through substancespecific procedures. Democratic theory suggests that this result may not be
a bad thing.
Consider the contrary assumption that has animated the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in Phase Three. In Gasperini, the Court seemed
almost to feel guilty about the existence of the Seventh Amendment as a
constraint on federal courts. 233 It reasoned as if state legislators enact their
laws in a state-only bubble and the entire burden of figuring out how to
carry out their wishes in diversity cases must fall on the federal courts.
State legislators, however, should be assumed to be aware of diversity
jurisdiction, and there is nothing wrong with expecting them to take it into
account. If Congress had considered a statute similar to the New York law
at issue in Gasperini,the Seventh Amendment would surely have been a
topic of discussion; New York legislators should have had the same
conversation.
Consider also the state laws at issue in Shady Grove. The substantive
law proclaimed that insurance companies would be liable for a 2 percent
penalty if they failed to pay claims in a timely fashion.234 Perhaps, when
this law was enacted, legislators and insurers alike knew that it would
rarely be enforced: the cost of litigation would outweigh the potential
recovery in individual actions, and the state prohibition on penalty class
actions would prevent aggregation.235 The availability of class actions in
federal court changed that, leading to far more efficient enforcement of the
substantive right proclaimed on the face of the statute. Now, perhaps, as a
matter of regulatory policy, this outcome overdeters: it makes insurance
companies rush their payments too much, or it imposes liability out of
proportion to their moral culpability, or it makes too many campaign
contributors unhappy. If that is so, the legislature should change the
substantive law. This outcome is preferable to keeping the same lawpromising ordinary citizens that they are protected by this penalty-but
disabling the courts from enforcing it. If the legislature says that insurance

232. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91-92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result) ("[N]o one doubts federal power over procedure.").
233. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); see also supra Part I.C.1
(describing the Supreme Court's accommodation of state law in Gasperini).
234. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insur. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010).
235. Cf Main, supra note 199, at 823 25 (arguing that legislators enact substantive law against a
backdrop of procedures they assume will apply).
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companies should pay 2 percent penalties, courts are entitled to assume
that the legislature actually wants this to happen. They should adopt
procedures that achieve this result in as "just, speedy, and inexpensive" a
fashion as possible. 236 Separating substance from procedure, artificial as it
may be in some senses, has the virtue of requiring the legislature to speak
as clearly as possible in the substantive law.
This separation of substance and procedure is also consistent with
congressional action from the REA to the present. Although Congress
initially recognized the importance of state substantive law by enacting the
RDA, since 1938 it has regularly expressed a preference for independent
federal procedure. That preference has become so pronounced in recent
years that it prompted Geoffrey Hazard to ask, "Has the Erie doctrine been
repealed by Congress?" 238 Hazard argues that the judicial system
envisioned by Congress is best described as follows: "State law is the
substantive basis of the American legal system, displaced only selectively
by federal substantive law. The federal court system, however, provides
the premier American model of the judiciary and, as such, is called upon
to administer its form of justice in legal disputes."2 39 In statutes like the
Class Action Fairness Act, Congress has expressed its view that, "in
certain types of cases, the judicious administration of state law is better
entrusted to federal courts."240
The dichotomy between substance and procedure may be artificial and
thus difficult to define and maintain. It is nonetheless a dichotomy that
Congress has placed at the foundation of the federal judicial system and
that serves important functions in that system. In Erie's Third Phase, a
shifting plurality of the Supreme Court has begun to break down that
dichotomy, apparently in the name of state democratic processes. Statelevel democracy, however, does not need this solicitude. Just as the courts
are frequently at pains to ascertain and apply state substantive law, state
lawmakers can reasonably be expected to ascertain federal procedural law,
and to plan accordingly. If they do so, uniform federal procedure will not
stand in the way of their substantive goals. Moreover, state law will gain
in democratic legitimacy and transparency because lawmakers will be

236. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
237. Hazard, supra note 129, at 1639 (describing a "long history of interaction between state and
federal courts in which different procedures have applied and in which federal procedure has often
trumped that of the state").
238. Id. at 1629 (title).
239. Id. at 1630.
240. Id. at 1629; see also supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing the Class Action
Fairness Act).
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prevented from manipulating procedure in ways that undermine the
apparent goals of substantive law.
III. ENDING PHASE THREE

Phase Three of Erie is characterized by discretionary lawmaking by the
federal courts. This discretion is claimed for the seemingly self-effacing
purpose of accommodating state policies. As it turns out, however, statelevel lawmaking would likely fare just as well or better in the face of
uniform federal procedure. Fortunately, Phase Three is so far strictly a
Supreme Court phenomenon, and the decisions in Gasperini and Semtek
can and should be contained. This Part sketches a plan for construing those
cases narrowly and bringing an end to Phase Three of Erie.
A. The Third Phase Has No Traction in the Lower Courts
Lower federal courts have routinely cited Gasperini and, to a lesser
extent, Semtek as the Supreme Court's most recent articulation of Erie
principles. 241 The lower courts have not, however, emulated the Supreme
Court's Phase-Three approach by creating their own accommodations of
state policy. Instead, they have continued to give "yes" or "no" answers to
Erie questions. Phase Three can therefore be contained as a Supreme
Court frolic that has not yet taken root in general federal practice.
Lower courts are presumably more sensitive than the Supreme Court to
the dangers of inviting litigants not only to argue for or against the
application of state or federal law but also to suggest novel
accommodations of the interests embodied in each. Perhaps for this
reason, I have found only one lower court decision that even considered
following the Phase Three strategy. In Houben v. Telular, the Seventh
Circuit reviewed the leading Erie cases in detail and then commented, "It
seems possible to us, in light of the substantive policy ... and in keeping
with Gasperini's approach, that state substantive interests and federal
procedural rules might be capable of accommodation."2 42 After a short

241. See, e.g., Rucker v. Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., 632 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Gasperini); Godin v. Schenks, 629 F.3d 79, 85, 89 n.16 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing both);
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 624 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Semtek); Biegas v.
Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gasperini); In re Ark-La-Tex
Timber Co., 482 F.3d 319, 330 n. 12 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Semtek); Stamathis v. Flying J, Inc., 389
F.3d 429, 438 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Gasperini); Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761
(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Gasperini). Semtek appears to be cited by the lower courts primarily in cases
raising issues of preclusion rather than as part of the general framework for Erie questions.
242. Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002).
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discussion of that possibility, however, the court concluded that the
accommodation was "too much of a strain" and decided not to apply state
law at all.243 This reluctance to follow the Gasperinipath bodes well for
ending the Third Phase before it takes hold beyond the Supreme Court.
B. ContainingSemtek
In Semtek, the Supreme Court may have had a legitimate reason for
creating federal common law based on its inherent power over procedure
in the federal courts. 244 The Court, however, was not transparent about
how it got there. The best way of limiting its effect in the future is to
confine its holding to the particular circumstances of the case-the
preclusive effect of a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds-rather
than to construe it as a general statement about preclusion.
The most serious difficulty posed by Semtek was its suggestion that
preclusion is, as a general matter, a substantive realm that is beyond the
reach of the REA.245 Other Federal Rules regulate matters that bear on
preclusion, such as permissive and compulsory joinder. 246 If read to deal
generally with preclusion, Semtek calls into question the validity of those
Rules as they are generally understood and applied.24 Instead, Semtek
should be construed as primarily a statute of limitations case, rather than a
preclusion case. At the next opportunity, the Court could clarify that
matters such as joinder, including the preclusive effects of failing to join a
compulsory claim, are within the scope of the REA.
While this approach is, admittedly, not the best reading of the Sentek
decision, it is at least plausible. Patrick Woolley has already shown how to
"save" federal preclusion rules from Semtek using the back door that the
Court left open for ensuring the preclusive effect of dismissal as a
sanction. 248 Recall Sentek's holding: the preclusive effect of a diversity
judgment is governed by federal common law; to determine the content of
that federal common law, courts should borrow from the preclusion law of

243. Houben, 309 F.3d at 1039.
244. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); see also supra Part 1.C.2.
245. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
246. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
247. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 724 (Sentek "preserves the validity of Rule
41(b), but only at the expense of casting doubt on other Federal Rules, notably Rule 13(a) on
compulsory counterclaims and Rule 23 on class actions, which presumably determine the preclusive
effect of any resulting judgment."). But see Burbank & Wolff, supra note 103, at 50 (stating that Rule
13 could "be used to support the application of federal common law of preclusion" only if "justified by
its non-preclusion policies").
248. Woolley, supra note 94, at 529-32.
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the forum state, unless federal interests demand a different rule.2 49 The
stated reason for the final caveat was the remote possibility of a state
failing to accord preclusive effect to dismissals that sanction a party.250
Professor Woolley, however, points out that strong federal interests are
also at stake in a variety of other aspects of the preclusion analysis, such as
joinder, whether claims are compulsory, and when a judgment becomes
final.251 Again, all of these federal interests are procedural interests,
properly governed through the REA and/or the inherent powers of the
courts. In Professor Woolley's assessment, only statutes of limitations and
questions of privity fail to trigger sufficient federal interests to warrant
uniform federal treatment.252
This re-reading of Semtek remains possible because the Semtek Court
did not firmly commit itself to the position that Rule 41(b) would be
invalid if construed to have preclusive effect.253 Its suggestion of that
possibility should be read in the context of a statute of limitations analysis.
Statutes of limitations have a unique place in Erie jurisprudence. It was a
statute of limitations that first drove the Court, in Guaranty Trust, to try to
articulate a test for when state law controlled in a diversity case. 254 Once
established, federal respect for state statutes of limitations contributed to
the excess of the First Phase in Ragan.2 Semtek should be seen as part of
this pattern rather than as establishing a general rule for preclusion
questions.
Under this approach, Semtek becomes the exception to a general rule
that the preclusive effect of a federal judgment is a matter of federal
procedural law. Rules of preclusion "really regulate procedure" and are
thus properly addressed in the Federal Rules. However, a few aspects of
preclusion law-statutes of limitations, perhaps privity-are sufficiently
substantive to warrant restrained interpretation of the Rules and are
substantive for Erie purposes, so that state law applies if the Federal Rules
do not. Importantly, the conclusion that these issues are substantive is a

249. Sentek, 531 U.S. at 508-09.
250. Sentek, 531 U.S. at 509.
251. Woolley, supranote 94, at 532; see also Erichson, supra note 144, at 1003 (pointing out that
"nearly all preclusion rules are transsubstantive").
252. Woolley, supra note 94, at 529 (arguing that "neither the Erie policy nor the REA prevents
recognition of the very strong federal interest in uniform federal rules of preclusion with respect to all
but a handful of issues").
253. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506.
254. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); see also supra text accompanying notes 6569.
255. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); see also supra text
accompanying notes 65-69.
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wholesale, not a retail, determination. One can say that 'joinder" is
properly deemed procedural and governed by the law of the court that
hears the case, while "privity" or "statutes of limitations" are best
governed by the law-supplying state without inquiring into what laws any
256
particular state has adopted in these matters.
In the alternative, the Court could adhere to the view suggested in
Semtek that preclusion is, in general, too substantive for the REA; perhaps
the Court would reach this conclusion in the course of adopting a more
rigorous approach to the REA than the "really regulates procedure" test.
The problem with Semtek, of course, is that the Supreme Court adhered to
that view only for the first half of the opinion. To be consistent, the Court
should have refrained from claiming inherent power over a matter it had
already cast as too substantive for the REA. The Court therefore should
have held that it was bound to follow state preclusion law not by federal
common law of its own creation but by the RDA. While I believe it would
be preferable to recognize most questions of preclusion as procedural for
REA purposes,2525 what is untenable is for the Court to claim inherent
procedural power while at the same time declaring the matter beyond the
reach of the REA.

256. The one major problem not addressed by this reading of Sentek is that even the new reading
retains the dual interpretation of Rule 4 1(b). The Rule means little or nothing in diversity cases but is
still understood to govern preclusion in federal question cases. The problem of duel interpretations
originated in Phase Two, not in Sentek. One way of dealing with this problem is to distinguish true
interpretations of the Rules from judicial "glosses" on the Rules, in which the courts fill in the
interstices of the Rules. A true interpretation would govern in a diversity case, but a "gloss" might give
way to state law if it were substantive for RDA purposes. See supra note 43 (discussing this strategy
for dealing with dual-interpretation cases). Short of flat-out overruling all the cases in which it has
occurred, the best thing that the Court can do is to just stop doing it, as it could have done in Semtek:
The most natural way to read Rule 41(b) is as a default rule for determining whether a federal court's
judgment was intended to be on the merits. A simple way out of the Semtek problem would have been
to hold that the plaintiff should have requested that the judgment be issued "without prejudice"
because California law, made applicable through the RDA, required as much. The district court's
refusal to do so could have been addressed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court's decision in Semtek
acknowledged this possible sequence of events in footnotes, Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506 n.2, but oddly
suggested that the plaintiffs failure to pursue the matter on direct appeal required that it be dealt with
in the subsequent case, rather than simply being defaulted. Id.
257. See generally Erichson,supra note 144, at 1002 03 (arguing that the best rule is to apply the
preclusion law of the jurisdiction that rendered the original judgment); Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 717, 760 (2005) (explaining that the
rendering court can have great influence on future preclusive application of its judgment, even though
it cannot purport to declare the judgment's applicability to future hypothetical cases).
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C. Containing Gasperini
The flaws in Gasperini are easier to confine to the circumstances of
that case. The Gasperini Court presented the case as if it could formulate,
not merely apply or not apply, New York law. 8 More specifically, the
Court indulged two errors in its approach. First, the Gasperini Court
neglected the original point of Erie: that state common law rules are, like
state statutes, "laws" under the RDA. Second, faced with what it deemed a
substantive New York law in conflict with the federal Constitution, the
Court should have used ordinary severability analysis (rather than its own
discretionary balancing of state and federal interests) to determine what
law to apply.
First, the description of Gasperini in Part I.C.1 follows the Court and
most commentators in describing the issue as whether the New York
statute on appellate review of damages applied in federal court. The
Supreme Court concluded that the statute was sufficiently substantive to
warrant application under Erie, but also that it conflicted with the Seventh
Amendment obligations of the federal courts. To read the body of the
Court's opinion, the Syllabus, and many other synopses of the holding,
one would think that the Supreme Court itself came up with the
compromise of accommodating state policy by having the trial court,
rather than the appellate court, perform the damages review.2 59
The problem with this description is that not one but two New York
laws were relevant in Gasperini.The first was the statute, which required
review of damages by appellate courts. 260 Second, as the Court briefly
acknowledged in its background section but then ignored for the rest of the
opinion, the common law of New York required damages review by trial
courts under the same standard. 261 Erie says that both the statute and the
common law are "laws."262 While the New York statute conflicted with
the Seventh Amendment and therefore could not apply in federal court, the
common law did not conflict with the Seventh Amendment and could

258. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
259. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419 (majority opinion) (holding that "New York's law ... can be
given effect, without detriment to the Seventh Amendment, if the review standard set out in CPLR
§ 5501(c) is applied by the federal trial court judge"); id. at 415 (Syllabus by the clerk of court)
(stating the same); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 707.
260. Gasperini,518 U.S. at 423 n.4 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c)).
261. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 425 (noting that the "deviates materially" standard, as construed by
New York's courts, instructs state trial judges as well). Whether this rule is considered pure common
law or a judicial expansion of the statute, the fact remains that the Supreme Court's analysis ignored
New York judicial opinions as a controlling source of state law.
262. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
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therefore apply.263 There was no need for creativity, accommodation, or
other interest balancing by the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, the Gasperini Court ignored the state's common law
rule and treated only the statute as "law" that might apply in federal
court.264 This raises the question: what if the common law rule had been
different? That is, New York must have some legal standard for when a
trial court can revise a jury verdict. 265 If that standard had happened to
differ from the standard prescribed by statute for appellate courts, the
Supreme Court's freelancing on how to "accommodate" the statute would
have ended up paradoxically displacing another state law. Gasperini did
not call for the Supreme Court to make up a federal common law of New
York damages because New York already had a common law of damages.
Second, in formulating its own accommodation of the statute, the
Supreme Court neglected the ordinary task of a court faced with a law that
is constitutional in part. Once the Court determined that the New York
statute represented a substantive policy choice under Erie, the next step
was to apply the statute. Faced with a Seventh Amendment barrier, it
should have done just what a New York court would have done, if the
Seventh Amendment had the same effect in state court: asked if the statute
was entirely unconstitutional or if some part of it could be saved by a
severability analysis. The severability analysis-under New York
severability rules, of course-may well have yielded the resolution that the
Court reached on its own. Whether it did or not, the decision would have
been better reached by the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation rather
than the Court's own creative process. The correct question was not "What
kind of accommodation can we make between state and federal interests?"
but "What would a New York court do, faced with this statute and a
constitutional barrier to applying it in full?"
An approach that focused on statutory interpretation would also be
superior because it would have a better chance of revealing the actual
legislative intent behind the New York statute, which is likely to bear on
the initial classification of the law as substantive or procedural. When
legislatures enact tort reform measures that implicate procedure, there is
nothing wrong with expecting them to know that state tort cases are

263. Gasperini,518 U.S. at431-33.
264. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426-31 (discussing the case as if only the statutory direction to
appellate courts were at issue).
265. See Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism,supra note 28 (manuscript at 41-42) (pointing
out that there is always state law on point, whether statutory law, case law, or an Erie guess about what
the state's highest court would do if presented with the question).
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litigated in both state and federal courts. New laws must therefore be
consistent with federal requirements for there to be a chance that they will
be fully enforced. Thus, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to
tiptoe around the inconvenient fact of the Seventh Amendment.
There is nothing incongruous about the New York statute producing
different review procedures in state and federal cases. That difference is a
function not of the substance/procedure distinction but of the Seventh
Amendment's status as one of a very few unincorporated rights.26 The
New York legislature can anticipate the operation of the federal
Constitution in federal court just as well as it can anticipate the operation
of the state constitution in state court. Although the statute was apparently
consistent with New York constitutional requirements, there is nothing
wrong with expecting New York legislators to anticipate Seventh
Amendment problems. If those legislators believed they were enacting
substantive policy that would apply in federal court, they should have
accommodated federal constitutional constraints. On the other hand, a
severability analysis grounded in legislative intent might have uncovered
that the legislature's concern was with excessive or widely varying
verdicts in local trials presided over by local, elected judges. There may
have been little concern about federal juries under federal judges. Since
the Supreme Court saw the statute itself as sounding in both substance and
procedure, it would have been worth asking at this point whether the
legislature's goal was to change the substantive law applied in all courts or
to correct for procedural biases in the state court system.267
It is unfortunate that the Court framed Gasperini as if its task were to
create a federal common law of New York tort damages. The Court likely
would have reached the same result by respecting New York common law
as much as it respected the New York statute, or even by performing a
severability analysis, but it would have kept the lines of authority clear.
State substantive policy should be implemented through state law,
properly interpreted, not by unauthorized federal common law.

266. Most provisions of the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution are incorporated
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The restrictions on
appellate review of jury verdicts that were at issue in Gasperini are among the few exceptions. See
Morris B. Hoffman, The Court Says No to "IncorporationRebound," 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 818, 83132 (2009) (reviewing the state of incorporation at that time).
267. Here, I am taking as given the Gasperini Court's conclusion that the New York law at issue
was substantive for RDA purposes and that no Federal Rule applied; the Seventh Amendment is the
only federal law in play. In the course of attempting to apply a state law conceded to be substantive, it
is of course appropriate to consider legislative intent. Doing so does not conflict with taking a
wholesale approach to the validity of the Federal Rules.
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CONCLUSION

Semtek and Gasperini each resulted in the unwarranted exercise of
federal judicial discretion rather than a straightforward choice between
state and federal law. However, the Supreme Court's creative energy on
Erie questions has not yet infected the lower courts, and both Semtek and
Gasperini can still be confined to their fairly narrow circumstances. The
split in Shady Grove indicates that the Supreme Court remains poised
between two paths: either ending Phase Three and returning to the
conceptual structure of Phase Two, or else continuing with Phase Three's
pattern of idiosyncratic accommodation of idiosyncratic state policies.
This Article has shown that the Phase-Three approach is unnecessary on
its own terms. The approach appears to be motivated largely by a sense
that special accommodations are necessary to protect substantive state
policy interests-the very interests that Erie itself vindicated. This
motivation is misplaced. Case-by-case modification of federal procedural
law is not necessary to protect states' democratically chosen policies.
Rather, uniform federal procedure will allow states to formulate
substantive policy with knowledge of the procedures through which that
policy will be enforced and will encourage state lawmakers to act openly
through the substantive law rather than manipulate outcomes with special
procedures. Shady Grove should therefore mark the end of Erie's Third
Phase.

